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PUBLIC DIPLOMACY VS. RUSSIAN BACKED PROPAGANDA IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES

As Peter Pomerantsev said recently, since the very beginning of the Russian hybrid warfare against Ukraine the Kremlin creates so called 'hall of mirrors' all the time. It means that Russian not free media show the own picture of the world that is permanently formed by the authoritarian government. Therefore some recommendations for the effective lie exposure of the propaganda in the Visegrad countries are essential.

Anti-Ukrainian publications and series in the Czech Republic and Slovakia can be the stimulus for the Russian propaganda. 'Ulice' (CZ) and 'Panelák' (SK) series show the general image of Ukraine's citizens as the migrant laborers that is extensively false. The same image is still prevailing in the motion pictures as well. There are also some newspapers in the aforesaid countries that mention Ukrainians in the criminal chronicles and emergencies only, e.g. 'Blesk' (Czech Republic) and 'Nový Čas' (Slovakia) editions that are the most popular there. The main problem is the lack of information or people's ignorance regarding Ukraine and its specificity.

Radio Sputnik (Moscow, Russia) that is being broadcasted in Poland leasing the radiofrequency from the Polish Radio Hobby since February 20, 2015, must be finally inspected and subsequently forbidden. In the case of Poland Russian propaganda tries to destroy Ukrainian-Polish dialogue by the lifting of the contradictory historical events both for Ukrainians and Poles, for example in the contemporary movies.

One more recommendation is the active cooperation of Ukrainian embassies with the pro-Ukrainian NGOs around the world. Ukrainian World Congress and the local organizations of Ukrainians are better versed in the adaptation problems of new migrants from Ukraine and more actively involved in the fighting with the Russian propaganda

by organizing the events on the situation in Crimea and Donbas.

In addition, the Ukrainian embassies should be presented more broadly. Ukraine's diplomatic missions' websites are rarely updated, but some ambassadors contribute more to promote and inform the aliens in the foreign countries they are serving, for example Andrii Deshchytzia, the incumbent Ambassador of Ukraine to Poland. Also the personal interference of the Ukrainian diplomats in the media unveiling misinformation process is needed. Common Ukrainians living in Visegrad countries should publicly appear on TV channels and other mass events, where they can present their own fortune stories. There is a strong lack of fast and accurate Ukraine's diplomatic reaction to the anti-Ukrainian statements of some Czech politicians in order to form the polemics with them.

The Ukrainian students' societies in each university in the EU should be established. These societies can organize the events and meetings on Ukraine being the truly public diplomacy 'weapon'. It is possible to establish small museums on Euromaidan and war conflict in Donbas along with the gatherings with successful Ukrainians, who could gain the advancement abroad.

Information security doctrines can be the effective response to the Russian hybrid warfare. The most recent example is National Security Bureau in Poland that is developing such strategy.

Last one recommendation is the support of investigative journalism projects by the EU and the Council of Europe, such as 'bellingcat' and 'StopFake' initiatives. They are more efficient than the newly founded governmental Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine.

THE MIGRATION POLICY: HOW TO BUILD A BETTER MIGRATION CONDITIONS IN EUROPEAN UNION AND V4 COUNTRIES?

The increasing role of the European Union in migration and asylum policy has been challenged with several regional and geopolitical processes. In fact, the latest political changes in the Arab region and increasing the refugee flow to neighbourhood countries has made several economic and political circumstances for whole EU and its neighbors. Undoubtedly, the Europe is also strongly influenced by demographic changes, including the ageing

population, longer life expectancies and a declining working-age population.¹

In this paper we are going to analyse the past and current migration dimensions in the EU and V4 countries, including the post-soviet influence in Eastern Europe. Also, we are looking forward to find out how better political and le-

gal strengths are needed in the whole Europe in order to decrease the illegal migration and to create strong common migration policy.

Based on the European Council's Strategic Guidelines on Justice and Home Affairs, the Commission develops a new in-house vision on migration. This policy brief assesses the underlying mechanics of policy-making on migration. Going back in 1999, when the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force, the EU has had a legislative competence to act in the field of migration and asylum. Further, the member states called to adopt a common migration and asylum policy in Tampere. After a decade, the EU has not reached the common agreement on these issues yet. In one hand, the 'impressive' legislative measures has been considered as a start point in this regard, in other hand, the common border control and harmonization of national legislation on migration and asylum has also been challenged with different governments in the member states.

The Europe 2020 Strategy² and the Stockholm Programme³ fully recognise the potential of migration for building a competitive and sustainable economy and they set out, as a clear political objective, the effective integration of legal migrants, underpinned by the respect and promotion of human rights. Further, the EU created the FRONTEX, which, facilitates and improves the application of existing and future EU measures relating to the management of external borders. Additionally, it complements EU' border systems and contributes to the freedom and security of EU citizens.

Some researchers consider that 'the migration situation that the EU and its member states are facing is more complex than this' and, in fact, borders, asylum and migration are already semi-Europeanized policies - a patchy framework that, as the latest spate of tragedies show, simply doesn't work: for migrants, border guards and Europeans alike.⁴

The control on the external borders and irregular migration is one the main priority agenda in the European Union. The question is risen whether the EU should act as a major actor in order to control over the migration crisis or give up for illegal flow of migrants in last decades in the Europe. I assume that the most EU governments are unlikely able or owing such good will to settle the thousands of refugees and migrant in their territory. What is the main problem? Economic crisis in southern European countries or lack of coordination and cooperation? These questions are often risen during the work of both the EU Parliament and Commission sessions. On 23 April 2014, in Malta, Jean-Claude Juncker presented a 'five point plan on immigration'⁵ calling for more solidarity in the EU's migration policy as part of his campaign to become European Commission President. The Plan included more broad cooperation with third-countries and strengthen the legal immigration. Following the Plan, on 13 May 2015, the European Commission presented its European Agenda on Migration,⁶ which sets out a comprehensive approach in

order to improve the management of migration in all its aspects.

The legality of the migration still remains the crucial agenda on the table of the EU governments. The EU has already taken several measures on legal immigration in order to 'cover the conditions of entry and residence for certain categories of immigrants, such as highly qualified workers subject to the 'EU Blue Card Directive' and students and researches'⁷. Additionally, the 'family reunification' and 'long-term residents' are guaranteed with relevant directives.

The latest 'Grexit' and an expected 'Brexit' in 2017 made some collaboration within the EU. It is obvious that the impact of the 'Brexit' may affect the whole European countries, including the Visegrad group (V4) as well. Alongside, the V4 countries have regional dimension in migration policy. The main human flow to V4 countries coming from the neighboring Eastern Partnership countries, such as Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. The dynamics of human flow is consistently changeable depending the latest Russian invasion to Ukraine and existence of non-democratic regime in Belarus. There is a huge interest of EaP countries to V4 slowly but steadily increasing due to easy migration geography and in some cases the simplified rules for citizens of Ukraine and Belarus.

The another issue is about the labour market in the Central and Western European countries and its implication to V4 countries. First of all, the Western European countries serves a huge percentage of labour migrant workers. In this respect, V4 countries lose the competition in attraction of migrant people from the third countries. Secondly, the another important issue is the better wages, social benefits and employment conditions that most migrant people prefer to be employed by the 'rich' European countries rather than V4.

There is an existing framework for EU co-operation on integration through the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union, which were agreed by the Council in 2004.⁸ The Principles affirms that integration should be a mutual process that both migrants and receiving societies have to be able to cooperate and collaborate in this respect. From the perspectives of integration, the role of the governments in V4 countries has been rising steadily since the Visegrad agreement reached and the V4 countries became the member of the EU. The starting point for the V4 countries is considered the same legal and policy mechanisms with the all member states.

In all V4 countries, the major migrant groups are coming from the Eastern European countries, especially from Ukraine and Belarus. The neighboring V4 countries are main visa issuance points for migrants, especially the Polish and Czech consulates play main role in this respect. The position of Moldova is different than other two countries. In fact, the people from Moldova mainly inte-

grate to Southern Europe. In the meantime, the Russian Federation is one of the leading country in receiving the huge number of migrants from Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. It should be noted that the past common Soviet culture and language made the immigration easy and feasible. The commonwealth Independent States has an agreement on non-visa regime between the post-Soviet countries. Only, in the last year, Russia has imposed the legal amendments to migration legislation and limited the duration of stay for migrants up to 3 months.

The new rules have entered into force on January 1, 2014 and had a restrictive provisions, which include new approaches to checking the legality of migration documents, the establishment of special centers for those awaiting deportation, the increased strength of the Federal Migration Service, and sanctions against employers hiring workers without due registration with the service. These factors have played the important role in the changing the migration destination by the post-soviet countries, especially the Eastern Partnership countries decided to integrate to Europe rather than politico-economically collapsing Russia.

The Visegrad group countries have to be involved in broader discussion on migration legislation in the Europe. First of all, if Member States are involved in monitoring of the implementation of the legislation, 'they are likely to be more invested in the outcome, and thus willing to undertake necessary reforms'⁹. Secondly, the 'old' EU member states have better experience and practice in order to undertake a monitoring and implementation of policy and legislation in this field. In this regard, Poland can be considered the one of main leading V4 representative in further processes. The role of Poland is especially remarkable in the simplified system of the immigration policies and procedures for third-country nationals. Poland has introduced a simplification of admission regulations to the labour market for third-country nationals. This is rules mainly addressed to the EaP countries and Russia in terms of liberalization of the visa system and better integration of migrants. In the meantime, Poland's EU accession in 2004 was a remarkable development in terms of human inflow and outflow as well as a legal and political developments within the migration policy of the country. The obligatory implementation of the EU 'acquis communautaire'¹⁰, further introduction of a new visa regime for third-country nationals in 2003 and in next steps, in 2007 by fully implementation of the agreement, Poland became a part of Schengen zone. It has considerable influence in migration flow between Poland and Eastern European countries. Also, a massive emigration of Poles mainly to UK has consistently increased after 2007. According to Fihel, in the same year, 'outflow reached its peak and more than 2.3 million Poles (6.6% of the total population) were registered in other EU countries as temporary residents'¹¹. This indicator shows that the role of Poland in migration has been considered both transit and emigration destination for neighborhood countries in the Eastern Europe in last decade. Referring to the same source, we can mention that the officially registered migrants in Poland has

been increasing year by year. For instance, at the end of 2013, according to Office for Foreigners 'almost 121,000 foreign nationals with valid residence permit were registered in Poland'¹². The main percentage of the migrants are Ukrainian nationals living with long term residence permit in Poland.

Conclusion

The migration as a security took a central role in the EU's priorities in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice in The Hague Programme for 2005-2010, as well the Stockholm Programme for 2010-2014. In some cases, the EU has embarked on a dialogue concerning visa liberalization was made conditional on third countries meeting 'extensive policy commitments as regards managing migration and internal security'¹³. The Visegrad countries have scored a major success in maintaining the momentum of visa liberalisation talks with all the EaP countries ready to engage in dialogue. However, the lack of coordination and cooperation within the member States has negatively influenced to further and broader discussion on this issue.

There are several factors that Poland has an advantage among the other V4 countries in migration destination for EaP countries. The Eastern Partnership countries and Russia are, and will most likely continue to be, 'the main source countries of labour migrants in Poland'¹⁴.

First of all, the economic growth in Poland is attracting the most migrant workers from Ukraine and Russia; secondly, the link between economic growth and increasing demand for foreign migrants in selected sectors of economy is considered as one of the reason for immigration. This is also included the experienced and professional workers in industry. Thirdly, the recent liberalization of the rules related to admission and employment of foreigners: The key government strategic document covering the issue of immigrant integration, "Migration Policy of Poland – Current State of Play and Further Actions"¹⁵ was adopted by the Polish government in July 2012 and has established the simplified rules for foreigners. Finally, we can mention that the recent election to European Parliament and rising role of polish politicians in the EU level has contributed to the political empowerment of Poland in the EU. Thus, the future of EU integration rules and migration conditions can be assessed with several indicators. The geopolitical importance of the V4 countries, especially the role of Poland in future communications with third countries in terms of visa liberalization and free flow of people to EU has to be implemented in coordination with relevant government. Also, in V4 countries, there are several differences of interest and tactics observed in their policies towards to migration policy. The common and well-coordinated migration policy is needed in order to develop and strengthen the regional security and illegal flow of migrants to the EU.

Annotations

¹ The increase in the total population of the EU in recent years was mainly due to net immigration. At the same time, the Union has witnessed a downward trend in immigration over the last few years, Eurostat, Statistics in focus, 1/2011, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-11-001/EN/KS-SF-11-001-EN.PDF

² Conclusions of the European Council, 25/26 March 2010, EUCO 7/10, CO EUR 4, CONCL 1.

³ The Stockholm Programme - An open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens, OJ 2010/C 115/01.

⁴ See <http://visegradinsight.eu/europes-migration-crisis-an-alternative-view-from-central-europe-130515/>

⁵ http://juncker.epp.eu/sites/default/files/attachments/nodes/en_02_immigration.pdf

⁶ http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf

⁷ See 'Entry and residence of highly qualified workers, 'The EU Blue Card Directive' Available at: [<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:l14573>].

⁸ See Council document 14615/04, 19.11.2004.

⁹ See Collet E, 'The development of EU policy on immigration and asylum: Rethinking coordination and leadership', Migration Policy Institute, Issue no.8, March 2016, p. 7.

¹⁰ See http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/chapters-of-the-acquis/index_en.htm

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
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¹⁴ See Lesińska, M., 'Immigration of Ukrainians and Russians into Poland Inflow, integration trends and policy impacts', INTERACT Research Report 2015/16, p.1; Available at: <http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/34684/INTERACT-RR-2015%20-%2006.pdf?sequence=1>

¹⁵ See Ministry of Interior, Polityka migracyjna Polski – stan obecny i postulowane działania [Migration policy of Poland – the current state and the postulated actions], Warsaw 2012.

MIGRATION IN THE EU AND VISEGRAD

In history migration flows of different scales always accompanied humanity. The reasons can vary from case to case but migration in general cannot be explained by single factor and is rather requiring combination of factors to be addressed. Factors such as war, political views, economic conditions, cultural specifics etc. may affect on migrants. Nowadays we are witnessing one of the largest migration waves in history caused dominantly by conflicts and wars in Middle East and economic situation in Africa and Eastern Europe. Lebanon with 4.5 million population is hosting near 1.2 million refugees that is the highest number per capita while Turkey is the largest refugee hosting country in the world with near 1.7 million refugees. Despite the fact that huge concentrations of migrants and refugees remain in neighboring countries of their origin the EU seems to be their primary target of destination.



The first destinations or so called frontline countries in EU are mainly Greece and Italy where people reach by dangerous journey in overloaded boats of smugglers who take money for services and simply leave people in waters of Mediterranean to be rescued by coast guards, risking to die if not. Inside EU some member countries such as Germany and Sweden for example are especially targeted due to their economic conditions and comparatively mild migration laws and policies. Once in EU migrants and refugees are applying for international protection or asylum. Asylum is a fundamental right, granting of asylum an international obligation first recognized in 1951 Geneva Convention on the protection of refugees. There is difference between terms "migrant" and "refugee" with huge difference in legal consequences for the person granted one of those two legal statuses. For this reason we need clearly distinguish term "migrant" from term "refugee".

International community today does not consider poverty being acceptable reason for granting refugee status to asylum seekers. The United Nations defines migrant as "an individual who has resided in a foreign country for

more than one year irrespective of the causes, voluntary or involuntary, and the means, regular or irregular, used to migrate".(2.4) At the same time International Organization for Migration indicates that "at international level, no universally accepted definition for "migrant" exists". (ibid) Emigration as defined by International Organization for Migration is "the act of departing or exiting from one State with a view to settling in another". (2.4) Refugee as defined in the text of Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugee 1951 is person "... owing well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it..."(1.5, p14).

The Problem

In the first half of 2015 the immigration to EU has passed all expectations and predictions transforming into humanitarian crisis. The situation requires from EU fast and adequate policies to deal with this issue. Despite implemented set of measures including ten point plan of European Commission in action, it is obvious that it is not competent and symmetric set of measures to tackle this challenge EU is facing. "Case of the "biggest challenge" developed over which there "has not been effective common position in Europe"" Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary Peter Szijjarto said in his interview published on web page of ministry on 6 August 2015. (2.7) "Let's not pretend that what the EU and its member states are doing is working. Migration is here to stay," The UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants Francois Crepeau said in his interview on 25th of August. (3.3) Governments of several EU member countries also share this opinion.

The Situation in Europe

There are disagreements among EU member countries over the common EU policy to face this challenge, but the latest developments show that disagreements are transforming into conflicts. An example of this was the announcement of 30 of August by France's Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius who said "he is shocked by the escalating migration crisis and accused eastern European countries like Hungary of not respecting European values. Hungary is very severe. Hungary is part of Europe.

Europe has some values and it doesn't respect these values. Like this razor wire barrier they built" Fabius said

in his interview with TV channel Europe1.(3.4) This off course created a reaction in Hungary and it is not exclude that French ambassador will be called to ministry for explanations. New migration wave brings the thoughts on the meaning of internal borders back and this is back step in terms of development of EU and its ideology. Several member states began showing vivid patterns of behavior of nation states as self interested agents of international relations. As European Commission President Jean-Claude Junkers said "what I see is finger pointing , a tired blame game which might win publicity, maybe even votes, but which is not actually solving any problems". (3.1) There is and will be increase in accumulation of wills in EU that will support policies promising to be efficient in achieving results when facing dilemma of their compatibility with EU values. The challenge posed by migration is a complex problem requiring comprehensive approach to be regulated. It will require huge resources, combined efforts of EU, international organizations, national governments of EU member countries, governments of third countries, local actors and also necessary time. In Europe immigration is a securitized issue for very long time but stronger for now than ever. In nowadays European political discourse it is reaching to critical points threatening to create situation undesirable from legal, ethical and political points. As result of massive migration wave migrants and refugees find them in unknown and sometimes hostile environment. Politically motivated crimes, violence, hatred, discrimination and intolerance are rising in EU in parallel with increase in number of migrants. Discrimination and unequal treatment by nationalist and populist movements, unemployment, trafficking and other factors will provide fertile soil for crime, radicalization and terrorist acts especially given the fact that there can be people entering Europe exclusively pursuing such goals. However, conspiracy theories such as one by Prime Minister of Hungary Victor Orban saying "some make this because they believe ... that the escalation of immigration can extremely weaken or even eliminate the national structures" rather support discrimination than help in finding solutions from situation and are unacceptable. (3.5) In globalized and mutually dependent world it seemed that civil society must and will support those in humanitarian crisis in need of protection. However large portions of people believe tragedy is when tragedy touches them not that it is taking place nearby. "Talking about „flows, „marauders, and „swarms is an unsubtle way of dismissing the legitimacy of the asylum-seekers and migrants' claim to human rights, by creating images linking them to toxic waste or natural disasters" UN Special Rapporteur on human rights Francois Crepeau noted.(3.3) "We are talking about men, women, children and even babies, who have faced traumatic experiences. These are people just like you and me, and none of us have the moral high ground to say that we would never do the same if we were in their shoes" he said.(ibid) He also said "Migrants are human beings with rights. When we dehumanise others, we dehumanise ourselves". (ibid) Several member countries while accepting the idea that no single EU member state has the capacity to address the issue of migration effectively,

believe that present EU response is not competent and symmetric to tackle the challenge and prioritize their national migration policies over common European one until better alternative is delivered.

In 2014 the number of irregular migrants entering EU was 276 113 which is 138% increase compared to 2013. (2.1) In 2014 EU has received 600 000 asylum applications [1.1, p12] while this year only Germany is expecting to receive 800 000 asylum seekers. Considering that the winter will arrive soon and tents need to be replaced with roof huge extra financial resources will be required.

The EU and governments of member countries are also concerned what kind of influence the unregulated and near uncontrollable wave of migration will have on socio-economic development of EU. Another problem is that many migrants do not want to be integrated to values they do not belong but want to benefit from goods such as freedom, rule of law, equality, tolerance etc. produced as a result of that values being exercised by locals. The experiences with some minorities in EU member countries separating in their social ghettos not to integrate must serve as an example when creating and enforcing effective integration policies.

It is obvious that overall situation creates necessity of more intensive and effective cooperation among member states. We can categorize soft and hard policy options on table suggested as potential solutions. The soft solutions are supported by EU institutions as common European policies while hard policies are supported in some member countries including UK and V4 members. Comparatively more welcoming policy is based on European values and international conventions while the latter is reaction mainly driven by security concerns. The suggestion of EU Commission to implement solution based on redistribution key that is quota system for member countries based on criteria such as "GDP, size of population, unemployment rate and past numbers of asylum seekers and of resettled refugees" seems to be balanced decision. (1.1, p19) However, member countries still have independence in making decision and it was strongly opposed in many member countries. The idea of asylum status valid in all member countries was strongly opposed by several members as well. The concept of Common European Asylum System simply cannot be effective until there is no coherent response through common policies. In his interview on 26 of August High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres mentioned number of 293000 refugees and migrant who tried to reach to EU, 2440 of whom died in Mediterranean.(3.2) Compared to more than 508 million EU population this is a number that EU has both the capacity and the size to absorb if management is done effectively in coherent manner. However the problem is that the numbers of migrants entering EU does not show signs of decrease until now, and thousands are arriving every day.

What can be done than to achieve better results given the situation as many insist on measures implemented not being competent and symmetric?

Recommendations and Policy Suggestions

General Policy Suggestions

- EU needs to immediately impose strategically well thought and practical policies as on EU level as on the level of member countries. With no internal borders EU the problem is matter of EU level more than of national level. However, that does not prevent nation states from having their own concerns and implement their own policies if those policies are coherent with EU laws, compatible with spirit of European values and do not fundamentally differ in their nature from that EU common policy.
- EU immigration policy must be built on common principles of security, solidarity and prosperity and be delivered in practice by concrete interconnected actions of governments of member states.
- More information exchange and centralization in operational coordination of EU member states is required
- Schengen area with free movement of people and goods is essential and extremely important achievement that must be safeguarded unconditionally.
- New mechanisms must be implemented for Schengen member countries to force each member to follow common rules and fulfill obligation in the field of migration control.
- The EU needs to mobilize its resources over better solutions than existing ones. Integrated approach to immigration and effective management must be part of such solutions.
- Harmonize management among actors interested and involved in regulation of crisis including EU candidate countries, international and local organizations (UNHCR, IOM etc.), third and partner countries.
- The implemented policies including return policies among most important ones must be done in line with EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, International conventions and agreements on asylum seekers and immigrants.
- Ensure protection of Fundamental Human rights in all acts and legislations. This must be guiding principle for all cases in all member countries without exceptions.

• Legal migration is a part of success of EU and its economy in future and it must not be damaged by challenges posed by irregular migration. Challenges should not be allowed to ruin opportunities.

• Short and long term goals must be defined and pursued.

1. In short term perspective EU needs to implement policies to save lives, secure, stabilize, and enforce return decisions (the last is both short and long term goal). Dramatic increase in implementation of return decisions for asylum applications is required. With less than half effectiveness in enforcing and competing the decisions 39.2% for 2013 (1.1, p9) it is impossible to have desirable result. The share of Balkan countries in asylum applications is more than third of all asylum applications in EU. Stricter regulations than EU has for now must apply to citizens of those countries with partnership of their governments.

2. In long term perspective the main task is to integrate migrants, fight crime and radicalization.

• More support must be offered to Greece, Italy, Hungary, Malta, Italy and Spain as frontline countries. The support needs to be not only financial but also through locating more common forces for protection of EU outside borders.

• Except "distribution key" EU members capacity assessment for relocation purposes must also include the assessment of security risks, economic potential, social environment of origin, cultural background, religious affiliation of migrants or refugees.

• Find legal channels to let refugees to find help in EU

• Place financial assets in building necessary conditions for migrants outside EU territory to maintain flows. Locate people and grant the right of asylum there. Once those points start functioning with necessary capacity, everyone arriving EU must be returned to apply for asylum there.

Security Policy Suggestions

The security of EU citizens is priority in whatever action EU takes. To ensure security of EU citizens in harmony with EU values and laws, EU policy on tackling security threats such as increase in crime, violence and terrorism includes five points` (1.3, p3-4)

1. "Ensure full compliance with fundamental rights;

2. Guarantee more transparency, accountability and democratic control;

3. Ensure better application and implementation of existing EU legal instruments

4. Provide more joined-up inter-agency and a cross-sectorial approach;

5. Bring together all internal and external dimensions of security"

The following necessary steps must be taken in framework of overall security measures`

- Increase the mandate of institutions combating trafficking and smuggling to increase the effectiveness in process.

- Strictly punish trafficking and crimes including provocations.

- Migrants must be strictly profiled with detailed profiles including biometrics. While EU is struggling with EU citizen or resident jihadist fighters coming back from war zones, the entry of huge number of people with unknown background contains extremely high security risks.

- Given non standard situation define new rules with changes of obligations and rights of immigrants in form of liquid rules that would be applicable for certain period and for certain categories.

- Define and apply to rules that would assure the place of migrant in EU society instead of leaving them in uncertainty and open to potential risks or becoming it for EU society.

- Future skill and labor strategies must be included and become part of this. Give and take approach must be applied.

- Minimize negative consequences and keep/encourage positives.

- Illegal employment by EU nationals must be strictly controlled with parallel implementation of supportive policies to help those with entrepreneurship potential to develop their ideas and skills.

- Migrants themselves must put efforts in integration to society they live in. Only government policies are not enough if they do not show enough willingness and enough efforts for this process. Hosting society language, culture, EU values to be compulsory to be learned by those granted asylum.

Integration Policy Suggestions

- Enforce common policy and integrate migrants and refugees

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PUBLIC DIPLOMACY VS. RUSSIAN BACKED PROPAGANDA IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA MAPPING THE SPHERES OF INFLUENCE: V4 AND EaP CONTEXT

Annotation

This paper provides overview of the capacities of Russian propaganda, threats it poses to Visegrad Group and Eastern Partnership by promoting Russia's political interests as well as gives recommendations on how to counter Russian propaganda within the regions of V4 and EaP. The main resources of Russian propaganda are analyzed, such as its speakers, channels of dissemination, audience reach as well as the variety of messages it sends regarding the V4 and EaP countries. It is claimed that due to the

doctrine of division of spheres of influence, the internal and external factors within EaP and V4 regions, Russian propaganda is threatening the security within the regions of V4 and EaP. The EU, V4, EaP need to apply consolidated and coordinated approach in order to minimize menacing impacts of Russian propaganda.

Problem Statement

In the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of the military conflict in the South-Eastern Ukraine

the world woke up with understanding that Russia's actions became possible not the least due to coordinated and continuous information influences. Its mechanism of instilling and perplexing public opinion in Russia and abroad has been functioning for years combining various soft power tools. Therefore, responding to Russian aggression the EU should apply multilevel approach taking into account the information front of this undeclared war.

"Weaponization of information", or "the war of perceptions" is a term applied by Peter Pomerantsev¹ to denote a set of disinformation techniques used by Russian political leadership in public and media discourse to reach its aggressive policy goals. More than dozen number of scholarly publications, reports and media researches on the topic of Russian propaganda were released following the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of a hybrid war in Donbas. Some Western scholars tend to call their analysis of Russian propaganda "anatomy" associating it with decomposition of bodies by a surgeon (such as Ben Nimmo's "Anatomy of an info-war: How Russia's propaganda machine works, and how to counter it"², Jolanta Darcewska's "The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare"³ etc.). This "anatomic" analysis shows, according to Jolanta Darcewska, that Russian propaganda, in fact, lacks innovative potential and therefore is weak. In other words, Russian propaganda is a set of the old techniques from the Soviet times when public narrative imposed by the communist party and the KGB served as a tool to rule the masses. Ben Nimmo calls his analysis of Russian propaganda "4 Ds strategy" aiming to "dismiss (the critique), distort (the information), distract (the audience), and dismay (the other side)"⁵. However, despite that, Russian propaganda approach seems simple and predictable through the viewpoint of experts (according to Nimmo and Darcewska); in the eyes of broader audience, these messages seem appealing and catchy. Using bright slogans and throwing fake multimedia content, Russian propaganda targets at ordinary people making them ready to become "food for powder" in the war that has nothing to do with their interests.

Russia's informational influences pose threats to V4 countries and the region of the EU's eastern neighborhood taking into account the external and internal factors. Geographic proximity and common socialist past that rather fuel anti-Russian sentiments as dominations and suppression and make V4 countries vulnerable to Russia. Other reasons for concern are the internal ones, such as the lack of agreement among V4 states on common security policy and response to the Ukrainian crisis, which is foremost, connected to business ties with Russia.

"Backsliding of democracy" is another tendency that makes Hungary less resilient to Russian informational influences. Backsliding in democracy is explained through authoritarian political tendencies observed in such countries as Hungary and to some extent in Czech Republic that can be exported within the region⁶. In addition, media independence becomes an issue in the V4 countries be-

cause of cases of ownership and financial dependency on business structures⁷.

The threat in Russian propaganda is that targeting at average population; it is aimed at formation of information space for "setting partition lines between the spheres of influence"⁸ and reestablishment of bipolar geopolitical system of the Soviet times. This does not exclude revision of the existing world order and state borders settled by the rules of international law (which has already had precedents in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova). In order to understand the potential of Russian propaganda machine, let us consider the main resources it operates to promote Russian policy goals.

The resources: speakers, channels, target audience

Russian propaganda combines variety of soft power tools to manipulate the opinion of its audiences. Below the major resources and capacities of Russian propaganda are presented – its speakers, channels, audience reach as well as messages it disseminates. In order to discuss the threats Russian propaganda poses to Visegrad Group and Eastern Partnership, this paper focuses on the main messages regarding V4 and EaP countries.

Speakers

The main "speakers" of the propaganda are Russian leadership - President (as well as his press-service), official diplomacy – Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, diaspora, think tanks and NGOs, media (which is also a channel for the previous speakers), the so-called Internet "army of trolls". As the "official Russia" mostly speaks to its audience through media, there is a need to focus on media channels more precisely. Pro-Putin 'double agents' in V4 and EaP countries create NGOs and think tanks that disseminate knowingly fraudulent statements, using the propaganda tolls. One of them, Czech think tank - the Institute of Slavic Strategic Studies (ISSS) established in Prague among others by Radka Zemanova-Kopecka, the active Czech journalists whose articles often appear on the pro-Russian websites. The international media platform - Czech Sputnik News, introduced in 2010 by the Russian Government, this source used to produce the content provided by the anonymous authors. There are also the Czech-language website – Aeronet.cz and the Czech journal distributed in both the Czech and Slovak Republics - Magazine Vedomí (AC24.cz) that used to publicize pro-Kremlin propaganda materials. Even more, the top think tank in Russia – Carnegie Moscow Center – was ashamed recently for provocative proximity to the Kremlin. This tendency are in both directions – outside and inside the country.

Media-channels

For 90% of Russians television is the primary source of information and 99% of Russian households have at least one TV-set at home. The majority of TV channels are state-owned companies and are under Kremlin's control – NTV Media, Perviy Kanal, Public Television of Russia, VGTRK, and NKS Media. The rest of the media groups are in the hands of pro-Kremlin oligarchs, such as Oleg Deripaska, Yuri Kovalchuk, Vladimir Potanin, Mikhail Prokhorov, Vladimir Yevtushenkov, and Alisher Usmanov. The only independent TV channel having popularity in Russia is TV Rain (Dozd) owned by Natalia Sindeyeva, media manager and publisher. Holding in a hand practically all TV-channels, the government can translate its position from different perspectives – through news, social, education, cultural and music programs.

The name of Dmitry Kiselyov has become a common name when someone referring to objective lie – kiselyovshina. Kiselyov is the famous Russian propagandist who was appointed by President Putin as the head of Rossiya Segodnia (Russia Today) media agency (former RIA Novosti and Voice of Russia) and the deputy director of the government's state TV holding VGTRK (All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company). Kiselyov became internationally famous after his commentary during the Crimean Crisis when he told that Russia 'the only country in the world capable of turning the U.S.A. into radioactive dust'. He is also homophobic and appealed to 'bury or burn the hearts of gays as inappropriate'.

Domestic media channels are utmost under the control of the Russian state and reach the audience of nearly 98% of Russian citizens⁹. Press freedom watchdogs point out the tremendous state's assault on media (Freedom House ranks Russia "not free" and Reporters without Borders documented numerous persecutions on freedom of press). According to the recent "bloggers law", Internet freedom is highly suppressed. Russian TV-channels such as First Channel, RTR and NTV are rebroadcasted by TV-channels in Eastern Partnership countries such as Belarus, Moldova, and Armenia.

Russia Today (RT) is accessible through Satellite and cable television and broadcasts in five major world languages. RT nowadays claims to reach 700 million viewers in more than 100 countries⁹. In 2015 RT, received EUR 300 million from Russian budget and the new news agency Sputnik was launched. Pro-Russian supplements and columns appear in huge Western media-outlets, such as Le Figaro ("La Russie d'Aujourd'hui" supplement) as well as paid pro-Russian sections in The Washington Post¹⁰.

Audience

1) Over 98% of Russian population is reached via Russia's TV-channels – First Chanel, Rossiya 1, and NTV

[11]. These media influences are extremely successful in manipulation of opinion at home – according to the opinion poll conducted by Levada Center in Russia, as of July 2015, nearly 59% of population approve that "Russia is heading in the right direction" and about 87% of the population "approve the actions of Vladimir Putin as the President"¹².

2) Russian propaganda strategy targets Russian minorities and other national minorities in order to deepen societal cleavages in other countries. Not long ago slogan "defending the Russian speaking population" justified Russian intervention and annexation of Crimea. Nowadays nearly 25% of ethnic Russians inhabit Latvia and the Russian state-owned channel, The First Baltic Channel, is claimed to be the second largest Latvian TV-channel [13]. Russian minority is a more crucial issue in the Eastern Partnership countries rather than to the V4 countries (Ukraine has 17.3% of ethnic Russian population according to the latest 2001 census [14], Belarus - 11%¹⁵, whereas for example only 0.2% of population of Czech Republic belongs to Russian minority¹⁶).

3) Russian-owned media targets at the EU and USA audience that are rather interested at coverage of their internal affairs than the situation in Russia or Ukraine crisis. For example, popularity of RT in the Great Britain is explained through the fact that while domestic media give monotonous coverage of political affairs, RT provides "alternative opinion" about the domestic affairs in the UK. In fact, this alternative opinion is built on "euroskeptical", "antiliberal", "anti-American", "anti-globalist" doctrine of Russian propaganda.

Messages about V4 and EaP countries

There is a specific set of messages sent by Russian propaganda about each country within V4 and EaP. These messages are claimed to be connected with the state of political relations between Russia and each particular country. Through the lens of Russian propaganda all countries are presented as either allies (positively covered) or friends (negatively covered) which is equal to whether these countries are considered within Russia's sphere of influence or not. The following examples show extreme cases of coverage of particular V4 and EaP countries, namely Hungary and Belarus that receive positive coverage, and Poland and Ukraine that receive negative coverage by the channels of Russian propaganda.

Allies

Hungary receives quite positive tone of coverage within the V4 region. This country's top leadership, such as prime minister Viktor Orban considers Russia its major business partner (especially in the nuclear energy sector) and attempts to cultivate Russian style of governance at

home. The plot of 18th March 2015 by First Channel covers Hungary among “the 7 brave ones”¹⁷ (seven EU states opposing expansion of EU sanctions on Russia) who wish to take their own decision regarding their relations with Russia and oppose to Brussels-led anti-Russian conspiracy. In addition, Russian propaganda machine has been infiltrating separatist mood in Zakarpattya region, the place of compact settlement of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine. In the story of 10th March Russia 1 Channel newscast “Vremya” the journalist justifies actions of Hungarian officials who distribute Hungarian passports to the citizens of Ukraine in violation of the Ukrainian law¹⁸. In order to instill separatist sentiments in Zakarpattya, media contrast prosperity of Hungary to instability, poverty and authoritarianism in Ukraine.

Belarus is perceived as an integral part of the Russia-led Eurasian Union and an exclusive sphere of Russian influence in economic and geopolitical realm. The plot of 3rd March of NTV channel covers the official meeting of delegations of Russian and Belarusian presidents aimed at summarizing the current state and discussing the perspectives of integration process between the two states¹⁹. Putin makes symbolic gesture by awarding Lukashenka with order of Yaroslav Nevskiy “for long-standing efforts in integration process” between Russia and Belarus. Russia and Belarus are frequently covered by the host as a “union state” (“soyuznoe gosudarstvo”), thus neglecting Belarus’ at least formal sovereignty. Thus, the rhetoric of Russian media towards Belarus remains exclusively positive, expressing “hopes for enhancing cooperation”, “going through the hardships together”.

Enemies

Poland has been an advocate of Eastern Partnership platform and one of the primary supporters of Ukraine in its conflict with Russia. These are some of the reasons why Poland has been accused of inherent Russophobia. For example, representative of NATO in Russia has been called “Polish and therefore Russophobe”²⁰. In addition, Russian media exaggerates other negative tendencies that might split Polish population. This can be illustrated by a plot of 1 March NTV newscast “Segodnya” which covers negative perception of Polish Oscar-awarded film “Ida” at home by describing anti-Jewish sentiments of the society and Polish resistance to admit their “historical guilt” towards Jewish people during the WWII²¹.

Ukraine has been the primary target of Russian information warfare and the major topic of Russian newscasts since the events of Euromaidan. For example, according to the results of monitoring of Russian media by MEMO98 and Internews Ukraine, 17.1% of total news coverage of the First Channel in March 2015 belonged to political affairs in Ukraine and 14.7% of it is about the conflict in the South-Eastern Ukraine²². Since the events of Euromaidan, Ukraine has been regularly covered as a “failed state”, “fascist junta”, and a state “incapable of independent develop-

ment for a quarter of century”. For instance, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, the leader of Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, sent an open letter to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Poland, Hungary, and Romania calling them to divide Ukrainian regions that used to belong to the above-mentioned states “in order to restore historical justice”²³. In his recent interview to Russia Today in Slovenia, Russian prime minister Dmitry Medvedev said: “I hope that someday we won’t have to remember that there used to be a state called Ukraine, as with Yugoslavia”²⁴.

Russia uses considerable resources in order to fund its propaganda system, including governmental and non-governmental tools, domestic and international channels. It is rhetoric of friends-enemies imposes biased opinion on the V4 and EaP countries among its audiences thus posing threats of influencing on the political agenda in the V4 and EaP. The Western democratic community has already started rebuttal of Russian information weaponization. The EU increases funding to increase capacities of independent media. As the joint initiative of Poland and the Netherlands, a new Russian-language TV-channel that will broadcast in the European Union will be launched the main idea of which to stop Russian propaganda in Europe. Among the non-institutional initiatives is the website Stopfake.org on fact checking launched by Ukrainian Kyiv-Mohyla School of Journalism and the Digital Future of Journalism Program. The source is well organized, constantly updating, with versions in several languages. However, because of the continues hijacking from Russia to the servers of this page, Russian ‘alternatives’ are mushrooming, such as the special web-page promoting the live and activity of Putin - putininfo.com and smear campaign on Russian opposition and civil activists - yapatriot.ru. Therefore, the EU should continue its actions in minimization of Russian propaganda influences.

Recommendations

1. Russia has never perceived and has not have any separate policy towards neither V4 nor EaP as the states, integrated by common interest, rather pursue bilateral relations with each particular country, depending on the particular perspective. V4 and EaP should introduced coherent and coincided information security policy towards Russia. This policy should include the following issues: (a) to resist to Russian ideological message on anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism, without direct confrontation messages; (b) to withstand to Russian aggressive cultural agenda, not allowing promoting the European image solely focused on homophobia, nationalism, traditionalism and xenophobia.
2. To finance and provide with professional human resources support of the newly introduced joint initiative of Poland and the Netherlands on launching the new TV channel that will broadcast in Russian language.

3. V4 media outlets and agencies should promote the creation of the media platform, performing more media cooperation, advocating high-professional standards of journalism and resisting to provocations from Russia, such as media campaigns claiming Poland for being the USA's puppet or encouraging Russian 'deactivation' of V4.

4. To expose in V4 and independent EaP media Russian lobby's groups, commentators, experts, NGOs activists and analytics who promote the Kremlin's policy and misinform the public, including the Russian expats and diaspora, living in V4.

5. To limit the access, introducing new legal regulations, of the Kremlin's and Russian oligarchs owned media to V4 and EaP countries, as it was recently in Ukraine. These broadcasters misinform the citizens about real situation in Russia and brainwash the Russians living in these countries. This initiative should also include the blocking of RT broadcaster in the hotels in the whole region.

6. To invest in the initiatives designed for Russian journalists and for journalists from EaP countries, such as internships, field trips to V4 broadcasters and outlets, experience sharing, workshops, discussions. There should be designed a special program both for professional journalists and the people how to recognize propaganda, including the special courses and campaigns on digital media literacy.

7. To increase funding of Russian independent media outlets that is working in Russia, promote the emergence of new broadcasters, and print media in Russia. For Russian independent media working inside the country there is no any possibility to get the financing in the country (for example, from foreign grants, because of the recently introduced 'patriotic stop-list'), either involving crowdfunding, because the people who donate money on independent media initiative will be persecuted (TV Rain (Dozd) faced with this particular problem). Those media outlets that is working from abroad, such as Meduza.io also have lack of finance and cannot work in a full force.

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MIGRATION BETWEEN VISEGRAD GROUP COUNTRIES AND UKRAINE AS COUNTRY OF EASTERN EUROPE

1. Visegrad group countries (V4) and Ukraine migration policies and cooperation: general review.

As part of today's comprehensive process of integration of Eastern European countries into the EU, migration issue is a major, which challenges V4 countries, as well as the countries of the Eastern Partnership. Dealing with the migration process, we should focus on migration policy of destination/transit country (in particular V4 countries)

and migration policy of the country of origin (in particular Ukraine).

Today, in the European integration process Ukraine's efforts, among others, aimed at liberalizing visa regime with the EU and V4, in particular Visa Liberalization Action Plan (VLAP). In addition, Ukraine launching the process of integration into the EU and signing EU-Ukraine Association Agreement demonstrates the "movement towards" in an effort of Ukraine to create a single European space with EU countries. This space requires appropriate legal regu-

lation and reform of migration for the control of migration flows, preventing illegal immigration etc.

24 May 2014 the European Commission decided that Ukraine has fulfilled benchmarks of the first phase of Visa Liberalization Action Plan and offered to move to the second phase of the VLAP. 23 June 2014 at the Council of the European Union at the level of Foreign Ministers proposed Ukraine to move to the second phase of implementation Visa Liberalization Action Plan¹.

17 July 2014 the European Parliament adopted a Resolution № 2014/2717 (RSP) on the situation in Ukraine². In paragraph 30 of this document was positively assessed Ukraine's transition to the second phase of the Visa Liberalization Action Plan and proposed to put in place the necessary legislative, political and institutional frameworks concerning visa regime. From its part, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 20 August 2014 adopted Resolution number 805r "On approval of the National Action Plan to implement the second phase of the Visa Liberalization Action Plan for Ukraine"³.

In turn, migration policy and migration status of the destination/transit countries, in particular the V4, differs substantially. Two of the four Visegrad countries - Poland and the Czech Republic are the main countries targeting immigrants from Ukraine. The role of the Czech Republic for the Ukrainians is very important, although it declined slightly due to the global economic crisis. Hungary attracts Ukrainians of Hungarian origin only, while Slovakia receives a small number of migrants from Ukraine.

Migration policy in these countries based on mentioned differences. Czech Republic, which in the past accounted a large flow of Ukrainian immigrants didn't significantly change migration policy. Instead, Poland, which is now among the V4 is the most important destination country for Ukrainian migrants, is in the process of liberalization of migration policy. Hungary sends its interests only to the migrants of Hungarian origin. Slovakia, in which migration is still seeing as a threat, in process of deciding whether to open or not a country for migrants from Ukraine⁴.

In all cases, the important issue is the migration destination country directly, because it is impossible for sure to distinguish between the number of migration flows to the countries of V4 and EU countries through V4. This is due to that fact that although the attractiveness of the V4 countries as a countries of residence slowly but steadily increasing for migrants, but other EU countries remain no less attractive to migrants, and in some cases even more. In this context, we should take into account, that Russia remains an important focus for the Ukrainian migrants (90%). According to the estimates, the number of migrants in the V4 countries is lower⁵.

Another important point that should be considered is that the experts of the V4 countries stand for signing "agreements, which guarantee the rights and opportunities of

migrant workers", which involves applying to a comprehensive and balanced approach to migration from Eastern Europe countries⁶. This is due to the fact that migrants from Ukraine mainly engaged in the secondary sectors of the economy (e.g. agriculture, construction, household activities) and do not create competition to the domestic labor force, but rather fill in labor shortages.

Today V4 countries and Ukraine not only take measures to promote cooperation and friendly relations in the long-term perspective, but as well developing new recommendations and proposals in the field of migration. From part of V4 countries these measures include in particular: opening of the education system for international students; simplification circular migration; recognition of qualifications of migrants from Eastern Partnership countries; promoting transparent migration policy; improving migration statistics; developing cooperation with Eastern Partnership countries and taking measures for liberalization of visa requirements for entry into the V4 countries and the EU.

In turn, from part of Ukraine these measures include in particular: fighting against corruption; launching more developed and democratic society; establishing a better coordination among government institutions that deal with migrants and coordinate migration policy.

According to the recommendations of V4 countries experts, also would be welcomed the following actions: launching programs of cultural and scientific exchange between the V4 countries and third countries; dissemination of information on migration/integration activities; dissemination of information on migration; developing of cross-border cooperation, including launching local border traffic regime between the countries of the V4 countries and Eastern Partnership⁷.

Based on the abovementioned it can be concluded that the migration policy of the V4 and Ukraine, along with the current migration situation, in general play a priority value in determining the further development of relations between these countries and forecasting the migration situation. All mentioned should also be taken into account and put in law, as well as the fact that V4 countries are not only destination countries, but also transit countries to different EU countries, in order to ensure proper control and supervision of migration flows to V4 countries and prevention of illegal migration.

2. Migration flows from Ukraine to the V4: migration tendencies (push and pull factors).

Today V4 countries do not hide their worries about possible flows of migrants from Ukraine in connection with the events that took place in Ukraine, such as Euromaidan, the annexation of the Crimea by Russia and, finally, the

war in Eastern Ukraine. According to a modular sample survey on labor migration in Ukraine, conducted in 2012, the International Labour Organisation revealed that about 1.2 million Ukrainian (3.4% of the population in the age group of 15 to 70) worked abroad in the period from January 2010 to June 2012 that generally indicates that the dynamics of Ukrainian emigration drops⁸. However, the rapid development of events in Ukraine encourages re-discuss the tendencies, causes and factors affecting on migration flows, in particular with the appearance of such factor as politically motivated emigration. It is necessary for timely response and regulation of mass migration in the event of such.

Migration tendencies can be explained using the concept of `push` and `pull factors`. Push factors can be described as unfavorable internal conditions that motivate people to seek `better life` abroad, and pull factors - as favorable conditions in the target countries of migration that make these countries more attractive to potential migrants. `Push factors` that influence on migration flows from Ukraine are:

- The economic situation in the country (in this case, the economic crisis in Ukraine);
- Migration policy in the country (legislative regulation and prospects for introduction of visa liberalization regime);
- Wages level (much lower than in V4 countries);
- Potential of Human Development Index (in Ukraine there are no opportunities for the development of this indicator);
- Poverty of the population;
- GDP (which is an indicator of economic welfare of the population and the country as well, which is now lower than in V4 countries);
- Political confrontation in the country of origin;
- The arbitrariness of law enforcement bodies and corruption in governmental institutions;
- Military conflict with Russia (which requires attracting significant resources and effects on the level of all the above-mentioned indicators).

Determination of the further development and tendencies in migration sphere of Ukraine depends on success of Ukraine in solving all these problems. In particular, deepening economic crisis, inciting military conflict with an external aggressor, slow implementation of reforms (including implementation of a democratic civil society and fighting against corruption), will retard improving of life standards and raising of Human Development Index in Ukraine. These will lead to lower not only GDP and wag-

es in the country, but also to the unemployment of the younger generation of Ukrainians, which will increase migration flows to V4 countries.

Besides the push factors, qualitative characteristics of migrants should also be taken into account. In particular, depending on the purpose of migration there are the following types of migrants: those who come for seasonal low-skilled jobs; studying/trainings; for reunion with family etc. We should not reject such factor as age. After all, the motivation for migration decreases with age because the older a person is the lower perceived benefits of moving abroad.

`Pull factors` that influence on migration flows from Ukraine (attractiveness of V4 countries):

- It is easier to find a job in destination/transit country;
- Higher wages;
- Higher standards of life;
- Better healthcare system;
- Better indicators economy in the destination/transit country;
- Migration policy of destination country, including the possibility of obtaining a residence permit and permission for work (regulation of migrants' rights);
- The similarity of language and culture (particularly in the case of V4);
- Psychological attitude (you can always return);
- Geographical proximity (not far from home);
- More opportunities due to the higher potential of Human Development Index

Both together and/or individually, all these factors can cause mass migration in the long-term perspective in following main types: work; reunion with family and studying. Even more, the last two types of migration will result in permanent residence and citizenship in V4 countries.

In addition, in case of worsening external military conflict with the aggressor, the number of applications for asylum and refugee status may increase. This promotes additional and most important factor in increasing migration flows from Ukraine to the V4 countries as politically motivated migration. In case of transformation migration process into a mass migration, it will require an appropriate political decisions and amendments to migration legislation on its liberalization or strengthening for the Ukrainian migrants.

3. Visa Liberalization for Ukraine: prospects and threats for V4 countries.

After general review of the first two paragraphs, it is necessary to discuss the prospects and threats for V4 countries if they liberalize the visa regime for Ukraine. This paragraph discusses impact of visa abolition for short-term travel for up to 90 days for the citizens of Ukraine.

As an example it was taken immigration to Germany citizens of Poland, Bulgaria and Romania before and after the introduction of visa-free regime (respectively in April 1991, April 2001 and January 2002). The example of Poland shows that, despite the fact that immediately after the introduction of visa-free regime number of Poles who entered Germany increased, this increase did not receive continuation in the number of people who settled in Germany. In fact, documented data migration from Poland to Germany indicates that it has increased only slightly. Number of immigrants from Poland to Germany increased slightly in 1992 in comparison with the numbers in 1991 after the introduction of visa-free regime, but then significantly reduced. It is worth noting that immigration from Poland to Germany increased significantly much later, after Poland joined the EU in 2004.

In the case of Bulgaria and Romania, slight increase in immigration to Germany was observed in the years of visa-free regime introduction by Germany. Visa-free regime was introduced for citizens of Bulgaria and Romania in 2002 and 2003, and since that time the increase of the number of immigrants wasn't noticed. Even more, tendency for further reducing the number of immigrants continued until 2007 (the year of joining to the EU), and then again held its rapid growth.

In the case of the former Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the Baltic states the migration situation was similar⁹. Thus, visa policy towards the countries of Central, Eastern Europe, and the Baltic States did not have any significant impact on immigration from these countries to Germany. There were much more other events, which had a significant influence on migration process, including EU enlargement to new members.

Based on the experience of other countries it is possible to make some forecasts for Ukraine. The increase in the number of migrants from Ukraine to V4 countries may cause potential risks and create new opportunities as well. Taking into account the characteristics of migrants coming for example from Ukraine to Poland, in particular their cultural proximity, minor problems with integration and high economic activity, the risks in fact are minimal. Strengthening xenophobia or aggravation of ethnic problems related to immigration from the Ukraine is insignificant, as well as the possibility that future immigration can lead to higher unemployment, crimes or impose additional burdens on the social security system. This is due to

the fact, that foreigners (Ukrainian migrants) are generally not perceived, as a threat of any kind.

The positive effects of the visa liberalization for a short-term travel include the following. Possible moderate increase in migration flows, including labor flows. Legalization of existing migrants will also increase, since the entry into the V4 countries for season work do not require visas, which in general will reduce illegal migrants. The number of people in Ukraine who travel to V4 countries for studying/training will also increase, especially for participation in short-term training programs, which in general will have a positive effect on strengthening interstate relations between Ukraine and V4 countries. Thus, the number of migrants arriving in the V4 countries for permanent employment, education and living will not significantly increase, because long-term stay still requires applying for visa and has more complicated procedure.

It should be noted that the most important positive impact of immigration from Ukraine is filling in the lack of labor forces and engaging students in learning in the educational system of V4 countries. In addition, experts also pointed out that the abolition of visas for short-term travel will strengthen cooperation with neighboring countries in Eastern Europe and will have a positive impact on their relationships. The abolition of the visa regime will facilitate circular migration and increase the number of tourists and shopping tours to V4 countries as well¹⁰.

In this case, I am tended to conclude that the abolition of visas for short-term travel (up to 90 days) will have a positive effect and will facilitate in filling in labor shortage in the V4 countries. Also, it will increase the number of Ukrainian students in the universities and higher education schools, which in the future give them opportunity to choose the host country within the legal framework. As a result, there will be a positive tendency in migration process in general and in particular, such as reduction of illegal migrants in the V4 countries, strengthening cooperation between the V4 and Ukraine.

Thus, if in the nearest future there is a visa liberalization for Ukraine, the increase of migration flows from Ukraine to the V4 countries will be gradual, insignificant and moderate. Today, for studying tendencies in migration flows since 2008 have been used data of the EU Statistical Office (Eurostat), which gathers the relevant statistics on migration by a standardized procedure according to the binding Regulation of the EU¹¹.

Annual Eurostat statistics on immigration flows, as time has shown, was incomplete and contradictory. In some cases, Member states failed to find reliable information, while data on other Member states was absent for full period of time and previous data had been reviewed due to changes in the definition, methodology or data collecting procedure. Thus, if the level of immigration from a country more-less the same quantitatively before and after visa liberalization suggests that visa liberalization

has no significant impact on immigration model. In the case of strengthening immigration after simplification of visa liberalization, we can speak of a causal connection between increase of migration flows and visa liberalization. However, can hardly be said that this is due to the visa liberalization.

But taking into account current political situation in Ukraine it is possible to have a different migration situation, in particular increase of migration flows or even mass migration. The increase of migration flows from Ukraine will take place due to 'push factors' such as: economic and political crisis in Ukraine in combination with need of foreign labor forces.

In addition, it can be assumed that Ukrainian migrants will continue to step forward to the EU, especially if Russia continue to make its legislation tougher for them. This mass migration is unlikely to appear, as in the case of substantial deterioration of the situation in Ukraine it is more likely internal mass migration, as it was in the situation of migration from the regions of military conflict to the central regions of the country. It is possible that the number of people asking for asylum will increase, not the general increase in migration flows. Special attention should also be paid to issues such as illegal migration, including labor migration.

According to V4 experts' position, this "illegality" associated with illegal employment. This may mean that the labor market in the context of employment of foreigners is the main focus of policy needs to be improved in all V4 countries.

In this context, it should be noted that the practice of the Czech Republic to conduct a broad campaign for the return of illegal migrants was successful. As a result, there is a tendency to reduce the number of illegal immigrants in the total number of migrants from Ukraine to the V4 countries.

Another question concerns the problem of transit migration. V4 countries can be in attractive for migrants from the perspective of long-term stay. That is why very often when it comes to agreements on visa facilitation or visa-free regime with third countries there is some skepticism because there are fears that visa liberalization can lead to uncontrolled flows of migrants in addition to immigration for residence.

In order to effectively combat and prevent uncontrolled migration flows sovereign states have the proper legislative regulations. The most common documents used for this purpose include: laws regulating the medium and long term stay of foreigners; checking the documents for identification person at the external borders (and sometimes inside of the country); establishing of requirements for short entry, such as obligations under a passport and visa. The Permanent though gradual changes in migration process encourage V4 countries to seek for new measures and ways of regulating migration policy now. Therefore, strengthening of control under foreign citizens, improvement of existing and development of new legislation, are capable to ensure the proper management of migration flows and detention of illegal immigration, which are the necessary measures after visa liberalization or even at the time of its implementation.

Annotations

¹Conclusions on Ukraine: Foreign Affairs Council Meeting (Luxembourg, 23 June 2014).

²Resolution 2014/2717 (RSP) of the European Parliament of 17 July 2014 on Ukraine.

³On approval of the National Action Plan to implement the second phase of the Visa Liberalization Action Plan for Ukraine: Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine number 805r, 20 August 2014.

⁴Forecasting migration between the EU, V4 and Eastern Europe impact of visa abolition, edited by: Marta Jaroszewicz, Magdalena Lesińska, http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/migration_report_0.pdf.

⁵Forecasting migration between the EU, V4 and Eastern Europe impact of visa abolition, edited by: Marta Jaroszewicz, Magdalena Lesińska, http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/migration_report_0.pdf.

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¹¹Regulation (EC) N° 862/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the European Community statistics on migration and international protection and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) N° 311/76 regarding the collection of statistics on foreign workers.

THE ENERGY UNION AND VISEGRAD COOPERATION

At the present time the Russian Federation uses energy as a tool for combating in global politics and economy striving alone to form and manage the world energy order. Russia uses the energy factor over the European space as an element of «hard power» in its relations with the ex-USSR republics, the Baltic and Eastern European states that once had belonged to the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. Setting economically unjustified and often politically motivated energy prices, promoting discriminatory “take or pay” model of relations in the gas market, Moscow tries stubbornly to keep dependence of European economies and impose a political line of conduct in exchange for easing in energy issues.

That’s why the creation of a common and truly competitive gas market is one of the key objectives of European energy policy, which is intended to offer consumers a greater choice of suppliers, lower prices and improve security of supply. Today individual states and gas companies are moving away from their traditional focus on the national gas markets; instead, they are beginning to develop a variety of concepts for the regional integration of Central European gas markets. Admittedly, these individual integration projects are at the initial stage of implementation, or even at the level of the general concept, but their appearance alone may herald a new “regional” stage in the development of gas markets.

We can assume three possible models of the EU gas market integration:

Full energy market integration, – occupied the merger by integrating their virtual trading points. The national gas markets should merge into larger, closely linked market areas (Single Energy Market of EU);

Regional energy market integration, – partial merger of the EU energy market according to principle of regional integration at the wholesale level by merging their virtual trading points and establishing a cross-border trading balancing zone. A tendency to regionalisation can also be observed in Central Europe, where there have been projects to create a common trading region made up of Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia; as well as a concept of a regional gas market that has been comprised (made up) of the Visegrad states (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary);

Local energy market integration, – merger of gas market of the two states via pipeline capacity to a directly neighboring, well-functioning wholesale gas market, for example the merger of the Czech Republic and Slovakia gas markets.

Nevertheless, the progress in creating a regional gas market in Europe remains slow, and its results are still uncertain. The gas markets in different countries are at different levels of development, and have distinct characters. However, without some form of regional integration of the Central European markets, it will be much more difficult to diversify the supply sources, attract investors and strengthen competition. We propose to realize some next steps in the direction of creating regional gas market of Visegrad states + Ukraine.

1. To establish a scientific expert platform in the framework of “Visegrad states + Ukraine” for conducting a comprehensive investigation of the creation of single regional gas market in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Ukraine. This can affect the balance of payments and the development of some sectors of economy of these counties and also their economic and energy security;

2. **To create common V4+Ukraine working group of first response to energy threats** at the official, scientific and expert level (politicians, lawyers, economists, engineers, psychologists etc.). We can’t exclude worsening or aggravation of the EU-Russia energy relations. The Russian Federation can use the Ukrainian crisis for cutting down, partial or full stop of natural gas supply to European countries. That’s why it is very important to have such working group of first response;

3. **To realize the information disclosure policy and regular communication of government institutions of V4 and Ukraine with community and stakeholders about energy (gas) security.** Actually the Kremlin uses energy factor for modeling and creation of intergovernmental conflicts on the European space, destruction of the solidarity of the EU countries and establishing a psychological pressure on the European community. At the last time Russia often uses information channels for injection of the unavoidability of a humanitarian disaster in the EU since Ukraine isn’t a reliable gas transit

country. To provide permanent monitoring of RU media and the Kremlin key messages, their transformation and dissemination in V4+Ukraine media and the needs of trust of local V4+Ukraine audiences for the formulation of the counter-messages to be media-boxed by V4+Ukraine News Agency;

4. To develop the concept of a common energy strategy of V4 countries + Ukraine. Enhancing mutual cooperation in all areas of energy and energy security in particular and developing rules of cooperation in elaborating common V4+Ukraine opinions in the context of the EU institutions and initiatives. The development of cooperation through joint projects and exchange of information on energy policies, as well as on related areas, particularly national legal and regulatory frameworks;

5. The establishment of a monitoring system of ownership in the energy sector of Visegrad states and Ukraine. The key goal of monitoring is to prevent the merger and acquisition integration of national energy companies with Russian Gazprom;

6. V4 countries and Ukraine have a unique energy potential: Ukraine has the biggest gas storage in Europe, Poland finishes to build the LNG-terminal in Swinoujście, Slovakia and the Czech Republic have an extensive system of interconnects and the pipeline. However, the lack of integration of V4 national pipelines is a very serious technical problem for nowadays. Therefore, it is necessary to build as soon as possible a network of gas interconnects between the countries. Ukraine can also provide alternative power for gas storage (seasonal storage and storage of strategic reserves of the EU countries). Today Ukraine is ready to open an access to 12-17 billion cubic meters of gas storage capacity for European customers, which are connected with the branched pipelines on Ukraine's border with 4 countries of the EU. In a result the European states can buy gas in summer for a better price, accumulate it in Ukrainian gas storage;

7. Ukraine can be an Emergency Gas route to the EU in the Balkans. These EU countries are the most vulnerable and dependent on Russian gas supplies. Using right now the Ukrainian GTS for gas supplies to the Balkans allows without additional financial investment and expansion works (без запятых) to bring gas from Central Europe to Romania and later in other countries of the region: up to 5 billion cubic meters from the Northern direction (GMS "Tech" / GMS "Mediesu Aurit") and up to 26 billion cubic meters coming from the East (via GMS "Orlovka" / GMS "Isaccea");

8. To create new V4 – Ukraine – Georgia gas corridor for the supply of Caspian gas. Diversification of gas supplies is an important object for the EU leadership. Access to Azerbaijani gas and LNG supplies will allow the EU to significantly reduce the dependence on sup-

plies from Russia. The building of LNG terminal in Odesa and branched Ukrainian GTS will ensure gas supplies in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Supplies with LNG-tankers from Azerbaijan to the EU and Ukraine through the Black sea is not only the shortest way, but also minimize transit risks, which always exist in the construction and operation of on-shore pipeline;

9. Ukraine is a concentrator of technical capacity to redirect volumes of gas and storage for the needs of the EU. The creation of a gas hub, which will include underground gas storages in Western Ukraine and GTS of the EU neighboring countries, is a perspective idea. The system of interconnects will provide the free volumes of gas flows between the EU countries, in particular Eastern and Southern Europe. For example, a gas hub can be created according to the "linked-hub" with other major regional hub (for instance, CEGH). The development of Eastern Europe spot gas market can have a beneficial effect on the current price situation on the global market. Ukraine can grant a special status for a zone LNG-terminal or gas hub, for example, free economic zone, which will operate under the jurisdiction and within the legal framework of the EU. Nowadays Ukraine is technically ready to start adaptation of schemes for obtaining gas transaction by "swap" and "backhaul" concept which serves as a standard for European operators;

10. To start negotiations about the establishment of a "Special fund of easy and fast money for a new energy architecture of Visegrad region" for macro financial support for V4 countries and Ukraine in case of emergencies such as avoiding critical situation in energy complex;

11. Performing a common analysis and risk assessment of existing and planned infrastructure projects. This could constitute a good basis for the establishment of a joint project to assess the supply risks of consumers in the region and the potential development of regional cooperation in crisis situations in the field of energy.

Political issues pose an extensive range of questions, including opportunities as well as threats and risks for building a regional market. The prospect of creating a Central European gas market should enjoy the full support and political backing of all Central European countries, thereby strengthening in the end their position towards the predominant supplier. That will be also a first step towards creating a pan-European common gas market. Having various infrastructural linkages in the region will improve safety and security of supply and using different gas prices for different states will prevent external suppliers from separation on the national markets. On the other hand, a regional market will benefit under conditions of increased competition, thereby reducing the prices. At the same time, a tight integration that has been developing not only

by expanding infrastructure and transmission, but also moving to the formation of regional market area would deprive the states of their individual autonomy in regularization of their own gas markets.

Slovakia and Hungary are currently discussing the necessity of reducing gas prices for individual customers. It would have been difficult to pursue the same policy in the case of their integration within a broader regional market,

because in the end integration will result in negotiating prices. In addition, deeper integration could reduce the impact of individual transit operators. Thereby, countries in the region may be confronted with the dilemma whether to strengthen integration which would lead to greater competition and lower gas prices, or whether to preserve a greater autonomy and ability to intervene in the process of establishing the tariffs and pricing in the domestic markets.

CAN EUROPEAN POLICY ON LEGAL MIGRATION AND FREE MOVEMENT BE MORAL?

Introduction

The title of a presentation of Boldizsár NAGY¹ from 1996 inspired me to consider the issues of present days' policy-making on legal migration and free movement from a moral perspective. His study intended to search for answers for the following question: Is it possible to unnecessarily many times invoke ideals in shaping the law and the facts arising from it, or shall we rather accept that facts determine the reactions of law, and therefore is it truly meaningless to dwell in ideals conflicting facts?

These questions get more and more topicality when not only observing, but in the meantime trying to understand the most recent events concerning mass influx of asylum-seekers, when their numbers at certain public places and in certain administrative procedures exceed the level to which the capacities of European states could easily get adjusted to. Nevertheless, my study intends not to focus on issues of asylum, but rather areas of legal migration and free movement, as even in the times of humanitarian catastrophes, regular migration should be given appropriate attention.

Compared to people seeking asylum moral issues might even rise in a more powerful way in case of regular migration, as EU Member States do not have a legal obligation to receive them on their territory, and therefore the primary principle ruling legal migration policy is that of selection. The right of EU Member States to select migrants based on different preferences may therefore rightfully pose moral questions: can any kind of preference direct the selection, or are there certain aspects that should never be the basis of decision-making when it comes to legal migration?

Selection applied in European legal migration policy

The concept of managed migration slowly shifting from

the area of irregular migration to the policy field of legal migration even in JHA Programmes of the EU clearly reflect the gradual acceptance of picking the "right" kind of migrants at EU level. While the Tampere and the Hague Programme use the task of managing migration mainly in the field of border control, fighting irregular migration and especially trafficking in human beings, the Stockholm Programme openly sets out the purpose of well-managed migration in a wider sense: "The European Council recognises both the opportunities and challenges posed by increased mobility of persons, and underlines that well-managed migration can be beneficial to all stakeholders²."

Nevertheless, what the EU means by "well-managed" migration, which is beneficial, among others, for EU Member States, might not seem so evident. Who has the right to determine on what basis someone's migration is beneficial, and which are the guiding aspects when evaluating the costs and benefits of legal migration? In my study³ therefore I was searching for clues in policy programmes and legal acts in order to identify what aspects the EU basis its evaluation on, and whether these aspects are values or rather interests.

The list of Directives on Legal Migration – Family Reunification Directive (2003/86/EC), Long-Term Residence Directive (2003/109/EC), Students Directive (2004/114/EC), Researchers Directive (2005/71/EC), EU Blue Card Directive (2009/50/EC), Single Permit Directive (2011/98/EU), Seasonal Workers Directive (2014/36/EU), ICT Directive (2014/66/EU) – draws a very instructive line of legislation. In the initial phase the legal acts targeted groups of third-country nationals were selected upon certain values, and focused on the needs of migrants, such as the unity of family, or the well-deserved secure legal status of the well-integrated long-term migrants. The next phase of legislation concerning research and pursuing studies are beneficial for both the receiving and the sending states. Contrary to the initial results of harmonizing legal migration, the second half of the legislative outcomes of EU negotiations is definitely characterized by the interests of the EU, namely how to attract third-country nationals eco-

nomically beneficial for the EU Member States. The European Council made no secret of this intention, the idea first visible in the Hague Programme was given even more importance in the Stockholm Programme: "The European Council equally recognises that, in the context of the important demographic challenges that will face the Union in the future with an increased demand for labour, flexible migration policies will make an important contribution to the Union's economic development and performance in the longer term⁴."

Consequently, on the one hand there is a clear shift in emphasis from values to interests when setting out the major basis for selective policy-making in the field of legal migration of third-country nationals. On the other hand, even in the case of recently promoted migration of those economically beneficial, there are even further, more detailed selection criteria we can identify: one can only enter if he/she is highly educated and/or there is no local work force in the applied position at the local labour market.

Given the more and more creative admission conditions set out by EU Member States many times making the application and the success in the admission possible burdensome, we can even more look at EU Directives as creating the framework of maximum burdens regarding admission conditions. I therefore argue that harmonizing legal migration can not only be viewed as legal acts meaning a compromise between Member States concerning admission criteria, but also can set limit to the colourful national ideas when selecting among migrants. This idea is supported by the Ben Alaya judgement⁵ of the Court of Justice of the European Union as a result of which Germany was forbidden to apply admission/selection criteria other than those set out by the Students Directive.

Selection applied in Free Movement issues

While it is basically generally accepted that EU Member States are allowed to give their preference in letting third-country nationals into their territory, the system of legal provisions facilitating free movement and residence of EEA citizens and their family members is meant to exclude selection instincts of Member States, especially those related to economic considerations. Unfortunately the present development of legal practice and policy dialogues show a different evolution of free movement issues.

Despite studies⁶ proving the significant advantages the mobility of EU citizens have brought especially for receiving Member States, in recent dialogues voices are also raised against keeping the present system of free movement. Yves PASCOU in his commentary⁷ called it a strong attack regarding the freedom of movement of EU citizens what four Ministers – representing Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom – made in a joint letter in April 2013. He argues that "the letter uses

concepts and words normally used in the field of immigration for third country nationals, thereby enabling EU citizens to be compared and treated as foreigners. This undermines the whole concept of EU citizenship⁸."

The issue reached the highest levels of policy-making in the EU, and consequently the European Commission started a collection of information in order to avoid demagogue perceptions of welfare tourism and other abuses of free movement. The result of the research was the Communication⁹ of the Commission proposing five actions to enhance a more conflict avoiding way of practicing free movement rights. The Council¹⁰ also took note of the communication from the European Commission and concluded that work will continue in cooperation with the Member States on the basis of the five actions outlined in the communication. The overwhelming majority of Member States agreed that the free movement of persons is a core principle of the European Union and a fundamental right of all EU citizens that should be upheld and promoted.

It was also an exceptional element of the Council meeting that the Hungarian states secretary, Károly KONTRÁT introduced a joint statement¹¹ made by the Visegrád countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) that was also circulated on this issue stating that the selective application of core freedoms by Member States leads to an erosion of the single market.

The Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of the Visegrád countries emphasized that "free movement of persons is a cornerstone of EU integration – an indispensable functional building block of a truly integrated Single Market. The single market however is "single" not only in terms of geographic extension but also by virtue of its cohesion. It is characterised by a delicate balance between its ingredients. The free movement of persons is as essential as the rest of the "freedoms". It not only referred to legal principles, but also to the factual evidence showing that migrants from Central and Eastern Europe have been hugely beneficial for the receiving countries' economies. The Joint Statement also admitted that there are revealed abuses concerning legal migration, and stated that the Visegrád countries are committed to help tackling these cases effectively under the existing EU legal framework: "The V4 countries remain committed to solve the pressing problems faced by societies everywhere in the EU, not just those subject to immigration: unemployment, abuse of the welfare state, tax avoidance and a decline in public order and public safety. However this can only be done commonly and on the basis of robust data and analysis." From the conflicting interests of EU Member States it can be concluded that receiving countries would like to extend their selection policy from the groups of third-country nationals to EU citizens and their family members, as well. We can more and more observe the reservation of the differences between the old and newer Member States instead of their approximation. Even more it seems that the citizens of Central and Eastern Europe are gradually regarded very similarly to third-country nationals from the point of the wish on behalf of receiving states to apply

selection policy, especially selection on the basis of economic usefulness. Apart from the fact that it is against the idea of free movement, it also raises moral issues in the field of mobility of EU citizens.

Conclusion

“There are a number of striking similarities in the challenges confronting European states: demand for skills in a knowledge-based economy, ageing populations, strains on welfare provisions, and public anxieties about the impacts of immigration¹².” It is therefore expected that the European Union is trying to achieve giving common answers by Member States to such crucial challenges. Nevertheless, what we can observe instead is the enhancement of many times apocryphal competition between Member States instead of policy-making for our common interests.

This competition can even lead to making economic considerations rule decisions that should instead be made either on a more complex consideration, or should even avoid measuring the value of mobility according to its economic benefit. The question whether policies on migration and mobility could be moral should be even more on the agenda in times when the mass influx of asylum-seekers enlarges and accelerates the already insisting conflicting interests.

Valsamis MITSILEGAS in his article¹³ casting a light on the challenges that the extension of state power and globalized migration control entail for fundamental rights and the rule of law, points out that in the European Union “globalization has been used to justify the extension of state power”. In these times, therefore, it is more and more important to make states and their leaders more aware of the meaning and consequences of their steps from a moral point of view.

Annotations

¹Presented at the conference of „Political strategy and migration” in 1996:
<http://menedek.hu/files/docs/migracio-politika/18.pdf>

²THE STOCKHOLM PROGRAMME – AN OPEN AND SECURE EUROPE SERVING AND PROTECTING CITIZENS, 2010/C 115/01, point 6

³Lehet-e morális a migrációs politika? - Az irányított migráció elve az Unió migrációs politikájában (Can the migration policy be moral? – The principle of managed migration in the Union’s migration policy)
In: Magyar Rendészet (Hungarian Law Enforcement) XII., 2012/1.HU-ISSN 1586-2895, pp.116-122

⁴The Stockholm Programme, point 6

⁵C-491/13. sz. Mohamed Ali Ben Alaya vs. Bundesrepublik Deutschland

⁶See e.g. Meghan Benton and Milica Petrovic: How Free is Free Movement? Dynamics and Drivers of Mobility Within the European Union, Migration Policy Institute Europe, March 2013

⁷Yves Pascouau, Strong attack against the freedom of movement of EU citizens: turning back the clock, EPC Commentary, 30 April 2013
http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_3491_strong_attack_against_the_freedom_of_movement_of_eu_citizens.pdf

⁸ibid.

⁹COM(2013) 837 final, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS

¹⁰3279th Council meeting Justice and Home Affairs Brussels, 5 and 6 December 2013

¹¹<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?!=EN&f=ST%2017395%202013%20INIT>

¹²C. Boswell & A. Geddes, Migration and Mobility in the European Union, Palgrave Macmillan, Great Britain 2011, p. 81.

¹³Valsamis Mitsilegas, Immigration Control in the Era of Globalization: Deflecting Foreigners, Weakening Citizens, Strengthening the State, in: Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Winter 2012), p. 3

FW THE ENERGY UNION AND VISEGRAD COOPERATION

Abstract

Energy plays an important role in the national security of any given country as a fuel to power the economic engine. The political and economic instability caused by conflict or other factors can prevent the proper functioning of the energy industry and energy infrastructure in a supplier country.

The proposals to establish a European Energy Union are continuation of EU energy policies to preserve energy security and reduce dependence on Russian energy supplies. The creation of EEU will not substantially decrease the energy supplies flowing from Russia to Europe, but they will assist to eradicate Moscow's ability to dictate prices in European markets and use energy as a weapon – a tool Russia often uses to achieve political ends. However, some of the broader initiatives of European energy Union are more likely to conflict with some member states' core national interests, since the greater harmonization of energy markets can not be achieved without collective effort and will. Even though V4 countries are more independent in terms of overall energy imports than the EU on average, from the energy supply perspectives their import structure is quite adverse. Present energy security situation in the Visegrad four countries should form the basis for cooperation in this field, giving impetus to further initiatives and identification of available opportunities for the purpose of hindering implementation of aggressive Russian energy policy.

Key words: Energy, Energy Security, European Energy Union, V4 countries, Russian energy policy.

Introduction

Energy has long been an important cross-sectional topic for Visegrad and EU in general. Following the current foreign affairs events, such as the Ukrainian crisis, its importance has grown even further.

All 4 Visegrad countries and the EU in general, are very energy intensive. The EU imports 53% of all the energy it consumes at a cost of more than €1 billion per day. Energy also makes up more than 20% of total imports (specifically EU imports 90% of its crude oil and 66% of its natural gas). (Energy, n.d.)

With its willingness to maintain a stable and ample supply of energy, the EU works on securing supplies from sustainable and reliable sources, thus benefiting from the diversification policy with competitive prices. In response to concerns surrounding the delivery of Russian gas via Ukraine, the EU launched its EU energy security strategy

in 2014. It lays out measures such as increasing energy efficiency as well as indigenous energy production or completing missing infrastructure links to redirect energy to where it is needed during a crisis. (Energy, n.d.)

On February 25, the European Commission unveiled its plan for an "Energy Union". This concept was first launched by Poland last year, in the wake of the crisis with Russia over Ukraine and its implications for gas security, and has since taken on a far wider dimension. (David Buchan, Malcolm Keay, 2015)

Current events in Ukraine and Russia have shown insufficiency of the cooperation among EU states concerning energy resources. Russia's energy strategy abroad has always aimed to maintain and deepen Europe's dependence on Russian energy supplies. This would help increase its economic and geopolitical influence, urging usage of energy for the sake of political game, as well as decrease risks to its national security.

Nowadays many experts claim to parade a mutual interdependence between the EU and Russia: the EU is dependent on Russian gas and other energy exports and Russia is dependent on the EU as its most important and the largest export market. However, the construction of expensive pipeline infrastructure effectively coerces consumers to be immured into long-term contracts with producers. This means that energy rich country, such as Russia, can (and does) easily wield energy dependence of importing countries into political and economic leverage. The ownership of huge energy resources and capabilities and the concentration of energy industries in the hands of the Russian government in the past decade, made Russia able to use its strength as a political weapon.

Russia realized that the existing east-west energy pipelines gave it the ability to block European access to non-Russian gas and oil from the Caspian and Central Asian region. Russia's use of energy resources and energy transmission systems to coerce its neighbors began as early as 1990, even before the formal collapse of the Soviet Union. The first countries to be targeted for energy intimidation were the three Baltic States, but others, like Ukraine, were soon pressured with the threat of losing natural gas imports.

The apparent willingness on Russia's part to use its control over gas supplies as a political tool rings alarm bells throughout Europe. One-half of Russian supplies to the EU, which looks to Russia as a key gas supplier but has sided with Ukraine's new government, flowed through Ukraine in 2013. Memories have been awakened of episodes in 2006 and 2009 when, amid pricing disputes, Russia cut off supplies to Ukraine at the height of winter, causing European gas prices to spike. (The Economist, 2014)

The transmitted information concerning already mentioned energy security architecture and its challenges are part of the Visegrad Security Cooperation Initiative that refers to the identification of shared challenges of all

Visegrad countries, determining their common interests, and proposing tangible solutions and links for the governments to enhance their cooperation in order to promote collective efforts in the field of energy security.

The key objectives for the V4 coordination in the EU is tied to the formation of the Energy Union. As the recent events has showed, energy dependent states can hardly secure their energy infrastructure and demands, since energy manipulation is not new for the "Bear Energy Market". There are plenty of examples of Russian Energy perils in the recent history, the recent acquainted occurrences refers to the Georgia and Ukraine. The BP run BTC pipeline is the only valuable item in Georgia (the only thing to fight over) and just 2 weeks before August War 2008, the promise of it being filled with Kazakh oil disappeared. And it disappeared into Russia's hands. Within a week the pipeline was blown up, and the Georgian offensive started. The scenarios are rather simple, energy becomes "a political football." Russia knows rules of the dishonest game very well and its every step is attempted to exploit the difficulties of energy co-operation to put pressure on Europe. And this happens despite the fact that a significant proportion of the country's revenue, and hence its economic development, depends on successful energy co-operation with Europe. Sounds even more irrational, it is clear that even the targets of sanctions in Russian-Ukrainian politics and business are not worth putting this collaboration in doubt. The current events in Ukraine can be a turning point and the path to a new campaign to reduce Europe's dependence on Russian energy supplies. The ongoing crisis may well provoke the European Union to lower its dependence on Russian energy supplies, since the escalation of the current situation in Ukraine may result in energy security risks in terms of gas supply for the EU and unpaid bills for Russia. The main task here is the EU's ability to diversify oil and gas supplies and secure consumption to meet its energy needs. To emphasize the Europe's bid to end energy dependence on Russia, we should identify EU's indigenous energy resources that might EU should find other supplier that may replace the lucrative energy deals with Russia in the foreseeable future.

Europe has significant shale gas reserves and, despite numerous challenges, next year might prove decisive for its production. Several companies have developed new technologies for so-called "green fracking" to mitigate ecological risks. These include introduction of synthetic gellants into the fracking 'cocktail' and the use of waste water for extraction. (Gusev, 2014)

Furthermore, the EU's consumption of renewable energy is increasing year by year. Despite renewable-based electricity is more expensive than power based on fossil fuels, costs could be decreased by new technologies. The Commission Communication on „Energy Technologies and Innovation“, published on 2 May 2013, sets out the strategy to enable the EU to have a world-class technology and innovation sector fit for coping with the challenges up to 2020 and beyond. (Mellár, 2015)

Yet another major area of the European energy sector

that is expected to see major changes in nearest future is nuclear. The governments of European countries are recovering from the shock of the Fukushima accident and dusting off plans to build nuclear plants. But if nuclear power becomes more widespread, the percentage of Russian exported uranium (currently Russia supplies the EU with 30pc of its uranium) could rise significantly. (Pakhomov, 2014)

The European Commission is preparing a "diplomatic energy action plan" to diversify the EU's natural gas supply sources, with plans for tapping Algeria's huge unexploited reserves. The Commission will convey a business forum "early next year" to analyse the reasons behind Algeria's chronic under-investment in natural gas extraction capacity, and the possibilities for tapping unexploited reserves – both conventional and non-conventional. (Simon, 2015) Despite the complex political situation in the Middle East and North Africa (the Arab Spring) has seriously destabilised these regions, enhanced political links on energy could boost investments in Algerian gas with the knock-on effect of improving Europe's energy security. "Algeria is a partner of crucial importance to the EU. The launch of an energy dialogue in Algiers today will contribute to a reinforcement of our bilateral cooperation in the new context of energy security," Miguel Arias Cañete, European Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy said. (Energy, 2015)

The completion of the European energy infrastructure is equally important and at the same time political support of respective projects from the V4 region should be considered as common Interests of the EU, since these projects can contribute to increasing security infrastructure of all four members of the Visegrad Group and eliminate energy related challenges.

However, cooperation of all V4 members with third countries is necessary in order to ensure security of energy supply. This definitely concerns Ukraine and other countries of the Eastern Partnership and the Energy Community.

Apart from seeking to make supply contract details more transparent, the European Union would seek to improve EU resilience by speeding up the installation of new interconnections between member states. Interconnectivity is vital for Energy Union, which aims to create a bloc where surplus energy can be moved across borders to make up shortages.

East European countries are entirely dependent on Russia for their natural gas imports. Yet they are also the most vocal about the EU's need to diversify away from Russia. That's because they know Russia can turn off the taps in a second - as in Latvia in 2003, Lithuania in 2006 and the Czech Republic in 2008 - with little reaction from Brussels. Russia managed to divide the EU by being a reliable supplier to Western Europe, while continuing to treat Eastern Europe as its "backyard." (BARAN, 2008)

Summary

To enhance the EU's long-term energy security, EU coun-

tries should retain collective effort and security interests and maintain energy security through diversifying external energy supplies, modernizing and constructing energy infrastructure, encouraging redirection of energy flows within the EU and coordinating national energy policies better with non-EU negotiating partners. Since EU members are dependent on energy supply from countries such as Russia, EU can not use its bargaining power and impose sanctions, or enforce collective actions when required.

The Russian plan is rather simple: Punish countries that refuse to come under its influence by building new gas pipelines that bypass them, while rewarding countries and political leaders that cooperate with Russia with lucrative energy deals. Maintaining a monopoly over the transport of Caspian gas to Europe is essential for Moscow to ensure that all those countries that have submitted to a Russian "partnership" will acquiesce to the return of the former Soviet space to the Kremlin's control. (BARAN, 2008) Europe's dependence on Russian energy has received criticism (particularly in the United States) and also its status as an energy superpower has been called into question by some. But still there are plenty of examples that shows how strong and increasingly important player "The Bear Energy Market" is in the global energy market, particularly in Europe and Eurasia. Rather more, the EU accurately indicates that Russia needs European energy consumers

as much as Europe needs Russian energy suppliers. Moscow, though, has managed to turn this mutual dependence into one-sided leverage. (BARAN, 2008) Even before the Ukrainian conflict, Russia had a clear interest in diversifying its gas exports - particularly to Asia. Whereas because of lack of energy infrastructure Asian energy markets cannot yet compensate sanctions imposed by EU on Russian energy sector and gas businesses.

Brussels and other European countries are threatening to punish Russia and hamper purchases of Russian energy. These threats are at least a decade old but Europe has yet to take any steps towards a radical change in the balance of its energy imports.

As the winter is coming, EU (and not only) citizens are waiting for the credible responses to the real threats. Imposing sanctions will be unavailing without concerted efforts and actions. Russia will continue operating its political leverage as long as it feels the capacity to do so. We saw the same fault line at the NATO summit in April that failed to offer a membership action plan (MAP) to either Georgia or Ukraine, further emboldening Mr. Putin to provoke the Georgians into an unwinnable war in 2008 and Ukrainians into crisis in 2014. It is simply not possible for the European Union to be united in what Russia considers to be its "sphere of influence" unless the Kremlin's energy leverage over the Continent is broken.

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THE ENERGY UNION AND VISEGRAD COOPERATION

The question of energy security is an extremely important factor for any country. First of all, this includes the so called energy independence. While reviewing the countries of Europe, in the vast majority of cases these are countries-consumers of energy sources, with a negative energy balance. It means that complete energy independence is not a possibility for those countries. Thus, energy independence is ensured – to a possible degree – by other factors that could be actually controlled by the consumer-countries themselves: organizational measures (establishment of unions and associations), political pressure on possible sources of threat (usually, upon energy-donor countries), obtaining control over energy supply companies in donor countries, supporting and stimulating loyal governments in donor countries, creating financial dependence of donor countries, and sometimes, even military intervention.

On their behalf, donor countries – which are mostly economically weakly-developed countries – wage constant fight (open and hidden) for preserving and enforcing their “energy” influence in the world. From the first glance, it seems that the methods used by those donor-countries are the same as those of energy-consumer states. However, due to questionable “civility” of many donor-countries, those methods acquire a very aggressive and dangerous character. There could emerge local wars, centres of tension and frozen conflicts are created, political overturns are organized, terrorism is being supported and financed. Such actions infringe energy security of energy-consumer states, making them hostages of someone’s specific interests and bringing wars and tragedies to the peaceful citizens.

When we look upon the states of affairs in the European Union, the picture is the following: united and prosperous Europe, after the fall of socialistic camp, acquired new members, and together with them – new challenges. For the past 25 years the majority of those challenges were more or less successfully solved, countries of Eastern Europe and the Balkans are positively developing their economies and democracies. However, when in 2013 Ukraine declared its desire to join the European Union, the question of energy security for Europe re-emerged with

a new force. Russia did not want to lose Ukraine out of its sphere of influence, as among other factors this would mean for the former the limitation of its donor pressure (and sometimes blackmail) upon Europe. Combined with military-political motives of Russia towards Ukraine, we get a set of reasons leading to Crimea annexation and military conflict in the East of Ukraine.

One could note that the conflict of consumer-donor of energy resources in Europe dates back to 1990ties and grew with the strengthening of Russia. After the crisis of Russian gas supply through Ukraine in 2004 and 2009 it became evident that Europe should really take care about its energy independence. The Visegrad countries and the countries of the South-Eastern Europe found themselves in the most vulnerable position. As a heritage from recent past – socialistic camp – those countries received a strong dependency from Russia in technological, as well as in partially political sphere. But then, no tangible losses were endured. V4 countries demonstrated their unity, adherence to democratic values and solidarity with the rest of Europe.

The year of 2005 marked a real process of the EU unification against energy aggression of Russia – the EU concluded an agreement with South East Europe Energy Community to “align the South East Europe and Black Sea Region with the EU’s internal energy market”¹. In 2011 the Community was joined by Ukraine as well.

As a vivid example of active resistance of the European community to energy aggression of Kremlin, we can refer to the antitrust investigation of the European Commission against “Gazprom”, started in September 2012. The European Union is ready to level an accusation against “Gazprom” for anti-competition activities, which could lead to the fine in the amount of 15 billion US dollars.

Those processes were somewhat “encouraged” by the events in Crimea and the East of Ukraine, which in their turn had been initiated by Moscow. Utterly aggressive and deceitful policy of Russia, accompanied by an unprecedented information war (as an important element of a hybrid war), opened to the vast public aggressive, an-

ti-human and cynical goals of Russia's leaders, including the sphere of energy. Gas and oil became weapons in the hands of Russia.

Thus, the events in Ukraine, as partially a result of the above mentioned contradictions between the super-players on the energy market – Russia and the European Union – simultaneously became the reason of a deep crisis in the interaction of those players, and firstly, in the sphere of energy. In such a situation, when their political and energy prosperity is endangered, the countries of Europe show unity regarding the events in Ukraine, as political and economic sanctions are applied towards Russia. Yet, not everything is as smooth as it could be, considering the overall sharpness of the situation.

In some European countries, particularly in some V4 countries, there are powers that due to various reasons do not seek strong measures towards Moscow. For a big part, such as situation is caused by a full-scale information war and propaganda, tremendously fed by Russia in those specific countries. As a result, there is not a sharp, yet a split within the Visegrad countries. If Poland consistently supports the European aspirations of Ukraine and openly criticises the actions of Russia, including its energy aggression, the governments of Hungary and Slovakia, in some questions, are leaning towards a pro-Russian position. Nevertheless, facing a real threat of energy security, V4 countries managed to agree upon the key issues, including Ukraine and gas security, also supporting the perspective of the EU and NATO expansion. A big success in enforcing the unity of the EU countries, and in supporting their energy security, as well as energy security of Ukraine, was shown by reverse-flow gas deliveries to the latter from V4 countries.

In spring 2015 leaders of the European countries made another important step to ensure energy security of Europe, thus proving their consistency and willingness to support the energy security policy. It was announced about the creation of the EU Energy Union. The Energy Union will “diversify Europe’s sources of energy and make better, more efficient use of energy produced within the EU”, “reduce the EU’s need for energy imports”, “renew the European emissions trading scheme, pushing for a global deal for climate change in Paris in December 2015, and encourage private investment in new infrastructure and technologies”, support “breakthroughs in low-carbon technologies by coordinating research and helping to finance projects in partnership with the private sector”².

It is also announced about the profound diversification of oil and gas supply on the European market. Russia stops being a strategic partner of the EU. EU Climate Action

and Energy Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete stated that “Europe’s oil dependence is double what the US’s was just before the 1979 oil crisis. For gas, we import a third of what we use from Russia. And the current crisis in Ukraine has shown just how vulnerable this dependence makes us. [...]When it comes to energy, don’t put your fate in the hand of autocratic regimes”³.

In its own turn, Ukraine is demonstrating its willingness to be a valid participant of the current process, interested in gaining energy stability and security. “Naftogaz” has reminded the EU about the advantages of a Ukrainian gas pipeline which could help the European Union to partially compensate its refusal from the Russian “South Stream”. Ukraine has offered to Europe its gas transmission network. This active usage of Ukraine’s gas transportation system will allow the countries of South East Europe to increase the level of their energy security despite the refusal to build “South Stream”, claims “Naftogaz Ukraine”. “We welcome the creation of a working group on behalf of the South-Eastern Europe countries, with the participation of European Commission Vice President Maroš Ševčovič. Within this working group, we would elaborate the plan of markets’ integration and the construction of interconnectors for Central and Eastern Europe. Ukraine has vast potential for gas storage and supply that is necessary to improve the current situation, and we are happy to make our input”, said the head of “Naftogaz” Andrej Kobalev⁴. Regarding the Visegrad countries, the latest summit in Bratislava demonstrated some tangible progress in overcoming the inner crisis and proving the will to continue the united European path. V4 diplomats expressed their full solidarity with Ukraine in protecting its territorial integrity and sovereignty, and confirmed their readiness to participate in concrete directions of reforms in Ukraine. For example, Slovakia will be responsible for the reforms in the sphere of energy and security in Ukraine.

Summarizing all the above mentioned, it becomes evident that the European Union, for the bigger part, managed to overcome all the indecisiveness and hesitance that had been recently present in its inner dialogue. Europe is on the way of creating a new and more effective system of energy security not only for itself, but for its neighbours and partners. The Visegrad countries, in particular, are among the first to benefit from those new policies. Thus, V4 leaders should not only support the creation of the Energy Union as a system of collective energy security, but put all their efforts to become its most active participants. Deliberate policies in energy sector would provide for the prosperous future of Visegrad countries and their neighbours.

Annotations

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