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V4: Promoting Democracy and Sharing Transition Experience

The countries of the Visegrád Group (V4) have recently made the transition from being a recipient of development aid to being engaged in providing development aid by themselves. Foreign assistance in transition has been an important factor for the three, later four countries of the region. The recent institutional memory of transition and their own experience in democratization have led Visegrád states to include supporting transition and democracy in their respective foreign policies. This paper presents V4 countries' efforts in that regard in order to provide a list of recommendations for utilizing their common potential in supporting democracy around the world while respecting their different approaches.

Democracy promotion in V4 development and foreign policy

Ever since their own transition, but especially since their accession to the European Union, the Visegrád countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland) are increasingly involved in international development as emerging donors.¹ In addition to geopolitical reasons, V4 countries are also committed to increasing their ODA/GNI levels due to the requirements of the European Consensus on Development Cooperation.² Given the fact that their own transitional experience provides them a supply of experiences that might be in demand by the international community to assist newly democratic states, democracy assistance is one of the fields where V4 countries have a comparative advantage.

Democracy assistance is indeed present in the foreign policy of all V4 countries, yet its role is different in individual cases. Poland plays a distinctive role in democracy assistance in the region, and support for democracy has been a part of Polish foreign policy for many years. After a successful and peaceful transition from communism to democracy and free market economy, Poland was one of the first V4 countries that realized the potential of its transition experience though the organization set up to transmit Polish experiences, the "Knowing How" Foundation, ceased its operations in 2005, only to be revived six years later. The aforementioned willingness was founded not only on an inner and selfless ambition to help. The support for democracy is considered as a tool of a long-term security policy in Polish strategic thought. When assisting others in their efforts to build a true democratic rule of law, Poland was to create a more peaceful and foreseeable environment with emphasis on the Eastern Polish border.³ The support for democracy is an official part of Polish foreign policy and it is broadly mentioned in a document entitled Polish Foreign Policy Priorities for 2012-2016, a multiannual strategy seeking to clarify the goals of the Polish diplomacy. The issue of promoting democracy abroad was also raised in May 2014 by former MFA Radosław Sikorski in his annual address to the Pol-

ish Parliament on the goals of the Polish foreign policy.⁴

Unlike Poland's democracy assistance, Hungary's is not emphasized, and it is primarily described in its strategic documents regarding international development.⁵ Hungary's first significant concept for international development was accepted in 2001. The concept provided some overall remarks on Hungary's policy regarding international development, though it remained overly general. Defending human rights and equality along with reinforcing democratic and civic structure was one of the main priorities of this document. An addition likely specific to Hungary also included the protection of national minorities and supporting communal autonomies. The document listed Hungary's transitional experience as a potential comparative advantage in knowledge transfer. The first concept was superseded in 2014 by the acceptance of Hungary's new international development strategy. The Strategy points out three clusters as the primary focal points of Hungarian development assistance, of which institutional development is the first on the list. The document names the following sectors and areas for this cluster: stabilizing democracy and rule of law, transfer of transitional and international integration experience, good governance, sectoral and local governance institutional development, capacity building, and strengthening civil society.⁶ International development itself was hardly on the Hungarian foreign policy agenda, though. The country is the only one in the V4 without membership in OECD's DAC, currently the only one without legislation dedicated to development aid, and the ratio of bilateral ODA to ODA disbursed through multilateral channels is the lowest in the region.

Slovakia's current mechanism of development assistance has its origins in 2003, three years after its accession to the OECD and a year before its accession to the EU. Official development assistance has become an integral component of the foreign policy of the Slovak Republic ever since. Over the past 10 years Slovakia has implemented more than 400 projects in nearly twenty countries. In 2013, Slovakia became a member of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (DAC OECD). The basic objectives of Slovak official development assistance (ODA) are human development of partner countries and support of democracy and good governance, including dialogue between civil society and state institutions. The primary tool used for planning the development assistance is the Medium-Term Strategy for Development Cooperation of the Slovak Republic for years 2014–2018 which is already the third conceptual document of the Slovak government represented by the Ministry of Foreign and the European Affairs of the Slovak Republic.⁷ Slovak foreign policy also relies on the country's membership in international organizations as a tool in democracy assistance.⁸

Legal framework for democracy assistance in V4 countries

The Czech Republic's primary legislation regarding development projects is the Act of 21 April 2010 on Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid, and Amending Related Laws. The promotion of democracy is listed as an element of development cooperation, but otherwise no specific rules for such projects exist at this level.

In Poland, the Development Cooperation Act of 16 September 2011 provides the general legal framework for the Polish ODA. The law specifically defines promoting and supporting the development of democracy and civil society, including development of parliamentarism, principles of good governance, and respect for human rights as one of the two elements in development aid. The law stipulates that 'measures in the field of development cooperation, owing to the specific political circumstances present in the country where the activity is implemented, may be commissioned by the minister responsible for foreign affairs to the Polish Foundation for International Development Cooperation "Know-How"' (from 2013 known as Solidarity Fund).

Slovakia's national framework is Law no. 617/2007 on the Official Development Aid and on the Amendment of the Law No. 575/2001 Coll. of Law on the Governmental Activity and Central State Administration. The law only mentions enhancing democracy with regard to the objective of securing security and peace in the world, but it does not set up any independent structures to deal with democracy assistance.

The development of a law on Hungarian international development was foreseen during the period of 2001–2003, but due to a multitude of reasons both the strategy and the law for international development have been postponed. Despite a resurgence of activities in 2007, the issue only experienced progress in 2012–2013 when the Parliament called for a strategy for international development. The Strategy was drafted in 2013, and after consultations with various NGOs, the Government codified its acceptance in March 2014. Although the Hungarian strategy established the mid-term policy framework for Hungarian ODA, this step had happened before the codification of a long-term legal framework. Hungary is currently the only V4 country that does not have such an overall legal frame for its development policy. The MFA is currently working on the law on international development, and already held its first consultations with other stakeholders, including civil society in September 2014. The law is expected to advance to the final drafting phase by the end of 2014, though the MFA indicated that due to legal difficulties, several other legislative acts are needed in order to provide a comprehensive framework. The most important of these will be a second act establishing and outlining the tasks of a Hungarian agency for international development.

In sum, all V4 countries include democracy assistance in their development policies, though only in Poland can one see the prominence of this topic to an extent that independent structures have been set up for this field in national legislation. This is related to Polish foreign policy and ambitions towards Eastern Europe – an interest that is shared by other V4 countries to some extent, but not without variations in importance and allocated resources.

Geographic scope of V4 members' involvement

Areas targeted by V4 democracy assistance are primarily Eastern Europe and the Balkans. In the field of democracy promotion, Poland is engaged globally in areas including the Middle East (Iraq, Afghanistan) and Africa (mainly Sub-Saharan countries like Tunisia). However, its main focus is oriented towards Eastern Europe. Naturally, the democratization of Ukraine is by far the most important. Belarus can be ranked as second on the list, followed by Georgia and Moldova. The choice of top priority countries is determined by Poland's security policy but it is also rooted in mutual history and some pragmatic considerations aiming at fostering economic ties.

Priority countries of the Czech TRANS program are defined by the official Czech foreign policy. Basically they are countries in transition and non-democratic countries where pro-democratic and pro-human rights movements exist and are likely to benefit from transition cooperation.⁹ Preference (but of course not exclusivity) is given to the countries with similar cultural, geographical, and historical backgrounds such as Eastern European countries and the Western Balkans (due to similarities there is the highest effectiveness of sharing the transition experience and promoting democracy). Priority countries currently include the Eastern Partnership countries (Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine), Western Balkans countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo), Iraq, Myanmar, Cuba, and Egypt. Some activities and projects have also been implemented in non-priority countries, e.g. in Armenia or Russia. For launching any activity or any project there has to be a clear demand and interest of other relevant and trustworthy partners in the concerned countries.

The Slovak program entitled CETIR is focused on experts from government sector as well as on representatives of civil society from the countries of Western Balkans, the Eastern Partnership or other transition countries. In the framework of 2014–2018 the following countries have been selected: Moldova, Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, and Ukraine.¹⁰

Hungary's first international development strategy designated four countries as strategic partners: Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Palestinian Authority, and Vietnam. In general, the Hungarian ODA is primarily channelled towards the Western Balkans, including the

very small share of ODA that is democracy assistance. Despite some projects in other parts of the world in the last two decades, such as human rights dialogues with China, a development presence in Afghanistan (without a democracy assistance element, unlike the Czech role) and other small initiatives, the Western Balkan region is the obvious priority for Hungary. In general it can be summed up that, despite some differences, the current direction towards the East remains to be the most important geographical area for individual V4 projects and cooperation, with the Balkans as another potential area to further common activities.

Democracy promotion frameworks in V4 countries

The Czech TRANS program is funded from the state budget and varies every year. According to the official webpage of the Czech MFA, in 2013 this budget was 49.48 million CZK (approximately 1.9 million EUR). The program recognizes five main priority topics, which reflect the capacities and capabilities of the Czech Republic as a donor, its specific interests and comparative advantages¹¹. These priority topics are: promoting the development of civil society (as a strong and active civil society is the cornerstone of a functioning and sustainable democracy), cooperation with local authorities (as the active participation of citizens in the decision-making processes, as well as the openness and transparency of the authorities, is a precondition of a functioning democracy), media (as the free and professional media is also one of the main preconditions for a stable democracy and a public control over political power), youth and education (as the active citizenship, critical approach to information, and the ability to formulate and present opinions is also crucial for the democracy) and human rights defenders (support of the activities that are in conformity with EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders).¹²

The program consists mainly of the support of so called soft projects – they include the exchange of information, experience and good practices, the organization of training and seminars, visits and internships of Czech experts to priority countries, as well as study visits to the Czech Republic for foreign participants involved in the projects.¹³ One special part of the Program is provision of “micro-grants” for small and starting non-profit NGOs (so called grassroots). The following tools are used to achieve the goals of the Program: state budget subsidies (the main tool following the annual call for applications), support distributed through Czech embassies in the priority countries (money is usually used to pay for minor items and services in the context of the transition process) and contracts of mandate (one-off services, elaboration of studies and supplies of material).¹⁴

In 2011, the Slovak MFEA launched the Centre for Experience Transfer from Integration and Reforms (CETIR). CETIR is one of the bilateral development cooperation

instruments of the Slovak ODA which is managed by the Slovak Agency for the International Development Cooperation (SAIDC). CETIR’s main mission is to share the Slovak experience from EU and NATO integration as well as knowledge gained during transformation process and implementation of the reforms. The centre is financed by the MFEA.¹⁵

CETIR focuses on eight sectoral priorities which are defined by the needs of the partner countries and by capabilities of Slovak governmental, non-governmental and business actors. These priorities are as following: reform and management of public finance, tax reforms, management and utilisation of EU financial tools; security sector reform; energy with emphasis on energy security and alternative resources; support of market environment development and small and medium enterprises; water protection, water and waste management; food security – adopting EU standards; decentralisation and public administration reform; building civil society and cooperation between the governmental sector and NGOs.¹⁶ One of the main advantages of the CETIR is its flexibility focused on fulfilling the specific needs of the partner countries; it means that partners receive help in those areas where it is most needed.¹⁷ Some main activities of the CETIR are study visits and partner consultations (the emphasis is on strengthening of the reform processes, fulfilling European perspective and improving good governance of public affairs through partner consultations)¹⁸ in selected sectors and state institutions, conferences, workshops, and public discussions. A database of experts (Slovak and those from partner countries) will be created to serve as a tool for future networking and cooperation.¹⁹ CETIR activities are implemented by the SAIDC through the CETIR Point of Contact in close cooperation with other Slovak ministries and governmental entities. The major role is played by Slovak embassies in partner countries, as they are on the spot.

Despite the concept for international development and the consequent channelling of financial resources to development assistance in the Hungarian budget from 2003 on, Hungary’s role as a donor in international development in general, and democracy assistance in particular, remained rather modest for the past decade. In 2002-2003 the MFA established its department tasked with cooperating development assistance, and the required legal and institutional frames have been established, but despite the strong coordinating role of the MFA, individual ministries played a significant role in project-level decision-making. The share of MFA-coordinated democracy assistance in Hungarian ODA and OA have been hardly significant during the period. In 2008 the MFA’s yearly report on international development included a whole chapter on democracy assistance, listing ongoing and past projects, but the 2009 report indicated that this was a one-time allocation from the MFA – even though a table on democracy assistance was also included in the latter. Hungary’s development policy in general has been the least developed amongst V4 countries and even the share of direct democracy pro-

motion in its ODA was a mere 0,7%, compared to the EU rate of 2%.²⁰ It remains to be seen how the current reorganization of the Hungarian MFA and the recent revitalization of Hungarian international development will affect the toolset available for state-lead Hungarian projects.

A potentially important asset for Hungary is the International Centre for Democratic Transition (ICDT) and the Centre for Democracy Public Foundation that provides supervision for the ICDT. The institution was set up in 2005 related to an initiative in the Community of Democracies that was supported by Hungary. The ICDT – along with the other institute under the supervision of the Centre for Democracy Public Foundation, the Tom Lantos Institute – conducts several small to medium projects a year related to democracy assistance, but despite the official involvement of the Hungarian government in its foundation and supervision, in practice it operates according to its *de jure* status as an NGO.²¹ Its regular sources of income are also not primarily originating from the Hungarian budget, but rather from other governmental or private actors. In sum, Hungary's toolset for democracy assistance is primarily defined by its international development policy in general and its future framework is largely to be shaped in the coming months.

In Poland, the scope of possible instruments differs considerably as far as various countries are concerned. Some of the tools are crafted for the needs of a particular partner, while others are more general and can be applicable everywhere. Technical expertise activities can be executed in a variety of forms, such as trainings, meetings, study visits, twinning projects, and high-level talks. Foreign delegations are invited to Poland or a group of Poles visit other countries. Technical expertise is transmitted within governments, public administration, local authorities, NGOs, media, companies, and different economic organizations.

The freedom of media is one of the most important fields of Polish assistance. Thanks to the Polish engagement and support (not only financial one) from people from the West, citizens in Belarus have access to free information through different channels: Bielsat TV, Radio Racja and Euroradio, as well on the Internet.²² Poland arranged (with the help of NGOs) trainings and internships for journalists as well as supporting their efforts in building free media around the world. Poland is also an active player in multi-lateral donor organizations, such DAC OECD.

Poland has initiated the foundation of two global initiatives – the Community of Democracies (an international coalition of states, created in 2000 as a joint initiative of Madeleine Albright and prof. Bronisław Gieremek aimed at bringing together governments, civil society and the private sector)²³ and the European Endowment for Democracy (a new independent, Brussels-based, grant-giving institution that supports local actors of democratic change – the idea of establishing the institution of this kind was introduced for the first time by Radosław Sikorski in 2011).²⁴

Poland is also engaged in supporting aspirations of other countries that are willing to be a part of the European Union. It is also crucial to mention here the Eastern Partnership, which was initiated by Poland in cooperation with Sweden. The EaP is a top-priority project for the Polish government which is aimed at supporting political, economic and societal reforms in order to foster democratic rule of law in six selected countries. The Polish transitional experience is perceived as crucial in this context.

Poland promotes democracy also through a wide range of different symbolic events. It can be observed especially now in 2014 as Poles are celebrating the 25th anniversary of the peaceful transition of power, which was marked by the first partially free elections. Many events have been recently organized to promote this achievement at the national level, but also abroad. The engagement of the incumbent president – Bronisław Komorowski – is very visible in this field. He was the one to initiate and execute the main celebrations, taking place in Warsaw. Poland was then present in the news around the world as the event was attended by many noble guests, including Barack Obama, who gave a speech praising the Polish fight for freedom. It is also worth mentioning that in 2014 Poland presented the Solidarity Prize. The award of 1 million EUR – sponsored by the Polish government – is to honor individuals who devote their lives to promote democracy.²⁵

Poland also sponsors internships for foreign students, PhD candidates, and post-docs, especially from the East. In 2014, the Ministry of Science and Higher Education launched a special program for Ukrainians, called "Polish Erasmus for Ukraine". This created 100 internships this year and will create 400 in 2015, an offer prepared by the Polish government for Ukraine.²⁶

Overall, the diversity of engaged partners and the variety of proposed tools and instruments show the strength of the Polish efforts in the scope, which seems to be extraordinary – particularly when compared with other countries in the region.

Main actors in democracy assistance

Following the classic scheme of sharing the transition experience, the major actors in this process are the government sector and the third sector.

In the Czech Republic the government sector is represented mainly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). One of the key goals of the Czech foreign policy is the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as the promotion of democracy. The Czech government set up a department in the MFA dedicated to issues related to democracy.²⁷ In 2005 the Czech government approved the Transition Promotion Program (TRANS Program), which was later updated in 2010. The main goal of the Program is to support the democracy

and human rights using the Czech Republic's recent experience with the social transition and democratization of the country.²⁸

Czech non-profit, non-governmental, and civil organizations and associations also take part in Czech democracy promotion. Many of these organizations and associations stand as official partners of the government sector in the Transition Promotion Program, but most of them also run their own projects and programs. Some of the most important players from the third sector include Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), Agora Central Europe, Caritas of the Archdiocese of Prague, Association for International Affairs, Burma Center Prague, Centre for the Study of Democracy and Culture, People In Need Czech Republic, DEMAS – Association for Democracy Assistance and Human Rights, EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, Caritas Czech Republic, LaStrada, Libri Prohibiti, Civic Belarus, Via Foundation, Organization for Aid to Refugees, Prague Security Studies Institute, Transitions Online, Transparency International Czech Republic, and many more.

People In Need Czech Republic belongs to the most known and most respected non-profit non-governmental organizations. They run several projects in the field of promoting democracy and sharing transition experience. They are involved in Belarus, Myanmar, Libya, Russia, Ukraine, Cuba, and Transnistria. Some projects they run by themselves, and others are implemented in cooperation with the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Their methods include mainly training seminars, internships, and distribution of publications on specific transformation aspects.²⁹

The Slovakian scheme is very similar to the Czech one. The main national coordinator for providing Slovak ODA (called SlovakAid) is the Ministry of Foreign and the European Affairs of the Slovak Republic. Of course the MFEA is not the only official institution involved in providing Slovak ODA – also ministries such as the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development are part of it. The Transformation Experience Sharing Program is one of the eight main programs of the Slovak ODA along side with Development Interventions Program, Business Partnership Program, Humanitarian Aid Program, Governmental Scholarships Program, Program for Sending Development Workers and Civil Experts to Developing Countries, Development Education and Public Awareness Program, and the Capacity Building Program.³⁰

The main non-governmental partner of the Slovak MFEA is the Slovak Non-Governmental Development Organisations Platform (NGDO). It is the umbrella organization of 31 non-governmental organizations in Slovakia primarily active in the area of international development cooperation and humanitarian assistance. Many of the member organizations are active in the field of promoting democ-

ocracy or sharing transition experience.³¹

Sharing the Polish transitional experience plays an important role in the agenda of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and currently it is considered as the main objective of the Polish development aid. The support for democracy is being carried out also by many other entities, not only public ones. Development aid is mainly distributed by NGOs, and their role in the whole process cannot be overlooked. In Poland there are many NGOs that are deeply involved in supporting pro-democratic changes across the globe. The MFA – through the Solidarity Fund PL, a state treasury foundation, providing aid to countries which are in the phase of transformation – funds projects carried out by Polish NGOs in cooperation with local partners from abroad. Since 2012, the Foundation has supported more than 180 projects of total value of nearly 30 million PLN.³²

As described above, Hungary does not possess a distinctive framework for democracy promotion as advanced as the ones in Poland or the Czech Republic. International development is primarily coordinated by the Department for International Development in the Hungarian MFAT, though in practice several other ministries take part in technical assistance programs. Hungarian civil society plays an important role in democracy promotion, though the financial means and scope of activities of the NGO scene is much less developed in comparison with the Czech one. The MFA's tenders for NGOs provided a solid, if modest, financial base for NGO operations in the field of democratic assistance, but dependence on external donors is clearly present for civil society projects. An important step for the Hungarian NGO sphere took place in late 2003, when several civil society actors established the Hungarian Association of NGOs for Development and Humanitarian Aid (HAND). HAND and its members organizations are the key civil society stakeholders in this field, and several organizations (eg. the European Center for Not-for-Profit Law or DemNet) specialize in democracy assistance projects, primarily in Eastern Europe.³³

Overall, government actors are rather different in V4 countries, while despite their activities, most V4 NGOs are struggling with a lack of funding, as their operations largely rely on external funding.

The future of democratic assistance in the V4 region

One potential challenge in V4 democracy promotion is that in the limited areas where all four countries are involved, political considerations might affect development projects, including democracy assistance. It has been recently observed when the major differences appeared within V4 with regard to the crisis in Ukraine. Another challenge might be the change of domestic political priorities in any V4 country. The perception and practice of democracy promotion by V4 countries was challenged between 2006-2010 in Slovakia and after 2010 in Hunga-

ry. Moreover, inconsistencies and shifts in foreign policy priorities might have a significant effect on overall ODA, and democracy assistance in particular.³⁴ For instance, it remains to be seen whether transitional assistance and institutional development will gain as much prominence in Hungarian ODA practice as these fields have in some official documents. 'Hungary's recently announced turn towards a foreign policy based primarily on economic and trade interests and the country's modest financial capabilities in providing ODA certainly raise the question whether an international development strategy focused on democracy assistance can be efficiently aligned with these factors.

It should be also pointed out that while the V4 countries certainly possess a comparative advantage in transferring transitional experiences, 25 years have passed by since the beginning of institutional political democratization in the region. Democratic transition as a priority field should be backed by a sufficient number of experts with first-hand field experience. Therefore the V4 will face the question in the mid-term whether their respective institutional memories are still relevant. Poland's focus on local governance or the success of Czech development in mobilizing NGOs, on the other hand, show that the overall transitional experience can be successfully converted into sector- or issue-oriented approaches that have their respective places in contemporary international development.

The most solid foundation for V4 cooperation in democracy assistance in the International Visegrád Fund, the only institutional part of V4. In fact, the Fund's operation emphasizes the importance of democracy, especially with regard to Eastern Partnership countries, through its current grant and scholarship initiatives. Apart from this, it is highly unlikely that the V4 will develop further institutional structures. Therefore any cooperation between V4 countries in the field of democracy assistance should rely on non-formal initiatives or the possibilities of the Fund. Keeping these limitations in mind, we propose the following measures to enhance V4 cooperation and coordination with regard to democracy assistance:

- The role of democracy assistance in the international development strategies of individual V4 countries and the Fund should be clarified. We should identify common V4 foreign policy objectives and start or enhance coordination and cooperation in selected regions or sectors. We should work together on the common priorities to make better use of dedicated resources.

- V4 countries should meet their obligation in ODA/GNI and should increase spending on development aid. There is also a possibility to agree on a democracy assistance/ODA ratio between V4 countries, eg. 7% of ODA. Such step would obviously require expert-level meetings establishing a common definition.

- We should further utilize the V4+ formats in order to exchange transitional and development experiences, similarly to the V4-Republic of Korea cooperation agreement.

- We should assess the possibilities of programmatic cooperation in democracy promotion within the framework of the Fund.

- In order to meet national political objectives to increase bilateral ODA, we should assess the feasibility of projects under multilateral of Fund supervision that use funds either disbursed from national budgets or from earmarked funds from the Fund's budget dedicated to meet OECD definition of ODA. Such practice can combine the strengths of multinational cooperation and the visibility of individual nations, as well as increase the share of bilateral ODA.

- The fields of engagement differ and each country has its own specialization. Therefore V4 countries should not duplicate efforts, but implement better coordination. In practice, synergies between individual technical assistance projects can be aligned in order to provide a comprehensive transitional assistance package at the V4 level in individual countries.

- Visegrád University Studies Grants currently exist as scientific cooperation and education tools without the added value of directly transferring experience to real-life projects. Synergies are needed between the Fund's university grants and practice-oriented programmes involving NGOs.

- The current Eastern Partnership scheme provides an excellent opportunity for student mobility, but the possibilities of the scheme can be further expanded. The Fund can plan and implement a follow-up scheme for EaP scholarships, including the requirement for scholarship recipients to submit a brief written report on their recommendations on cooperation in their respective fields.

Annotations

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